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
Korea: Future Problems, Future Policies

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
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KOREA: FUTURE PROBLEMS, FUTURE POLICIES

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By

Colonel Jack G. Callaway USA

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
FOREWORD

↘ The United States' involvement in Korea and its long-standing commitment to economic and military support of the Republic of Korea have remained a constant in the nation's national security policy. Wholehearted American participation in the Korean War and the Republic of Korea's continuing support of American Asian policies have forged a strong military and political bond between the two countries. ↙

(The continuing changes in the dynamics of international politics and the perceived requirement by the leadership in the United States to control defense expenditures have again brought forth proposals to reduce American defense spending. The extent of American commitment to the Republic of Korea is under review, as are the basic policies supporting this commitment. ↙

Colonel Jack G. Callaway's timely monograph examines the United States' presence in Korea against the Republic's growth since the Korean War, and its defense requirements in the future. Korea is an excellent test case for the whole of American policy in Asia, as well as in the broader global context.

The paper was written while Colonel Callaway was a member of the Strategic Research Group of The National War College, and is part of the continuing series of National Security Affairs Monographs published by the National Defense University.


H. LOBDELL, JR.
Major General, USAF
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Colonel Jack G. Callaway is the United States Defense Attache, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany. From 1975 to 1976 he was a staff member of the Strategic Research Group of The National War College. He received a BS degree in Civil Engineering from Texas A&M, a BS degree in Military Science from the University of Utah, and an MA degree in International Relations from George Washington University. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and The National War College. He served in Korea during the Korean War, and later as a field artillery battalion commander.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the early 1970's, there were frequent calls for the reduction of or withdrawal of all US armed forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and this proposal seemed sound enough at the time. American involvement in Vietnam was winding down. There was an ongoing dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concerning reunification of the country, and the warlike acts of North Korea had ceased—temporarily. In general, the scene in Northeast Asia in that time frame seemed stable and somewhat promising. Subsequently, the sudden and surprising collapse of Indochina sent a shock wave of anxiety reverberating throughout the world. The allies of the US began to be plagued by nagging doubts about the sincerity of American commitments concerning their security and they actively sought some real evidence of US resolve. This feeling of anxiety was increased still more by their concern that some Communist leader, such as Kim Il-Sung, who while enthused with the unparalleled success of Communist arms in Southeast Asia, might miscalculate the probability of success of a similar effort in Northeast Asia. In light of these circumstances, voices in the American Congress which had earlier been calling for the reduction or withdrawal of troops from South Korea were stilled since it was apparent to the majority that any withdrawal was likely to create the very instability in the region that the United States wished to preclude. Now the memory of these events, emotions, and very real concerns is no longer vivid to many, and there seems to be no real danger to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Such a perception does not seem to take cognizance of the fact that hostile acts committed against the South by the North have increased rather than decreased. The North-South talks have been stalemated since 1972. Kim continues to iterate his threat to reunify Korea by force; he refuses to consider the admission of the two Koreas to the UN; and he continues to contribute members of his armed forces to act as advisors to revolutionaries around the world. In addition, there is the increased Soviet naval presence in all areas of the Pacific. Notwithstanding this situation, we are now beginning to hear murmurings once again of reductions and withdrawals. Apparently some believe that the blaze has been doused and the firemen should now return to the station house—but what of the embers?

These proposals that we withdraw all forces from Korea may have some merit; however, there are a number of weighty questions, not all of which can be addressed here, that should be answered before the withdrawal of forces can be prudently implemented. Should the Republic of Korea have achieved a specific economic, military, social, and political posture before withdrawal begins, and, if so, what should

these various circumstances be? In view of the fact that the US is a signatory to a mutual defense treaty with South Korea, how might the US withdraw its forces from the peninsula and still maintain credibility—with the Republic of Korea and other nations who also find themselves in a defense alliance with America? Do the calls to withhold aid from the Republic of Korea because of the nature of its government really serve in the best manner to further the interests of the United States? Might a prioritization of our interests and an examination of the actions taken to achieve our objectives in South Korea and Northeast Asia produce a stable situation in this part of the world sooner than if we continue to let the various interests compete indefinitely for a high-priority listing for the allocation of resources?

Rather than stating a specific date by which all, or a significant number, of our forces will be withdrawn from Korea, it might be more prudent to recognize that there are circumstances which can adversely affect the accomplishment of this goal and which are beyond the ability of either the US or the ROK to control, such as the recession or the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Perhaps it might be more practical to determine the conditions which would greatly facilitate the reduction of forces in Korea by 1978.

If the theory can be accepted that a nation's survival and prosperity are vitally influenced by the conditions prevailing in the economic, political, and military sectors of its existence, then it appears logical that an examination of these aspects of the ROK's existence will indicate those conditions which should exist in each area in order to permit a prudent reduction or withdrawal of US forces. Briefly stated, these conditions are as follows:

Economic—*There should be continuous maturation of the economy that might range between a six and nine percent GNP growth rate; continuation of high drive export to GNP ratios; continued expansion of markets; increased marketability and continued diversification of products; continued growth in high technology manufacturing; continued diversification and increase of foreign investors; continued diversification of reliance on energy sources.*

Political—*There should continue to be domestic political stability. This will require that there be a most precise assessment of the expectations of the population and their*

ability to tolerate frustration in achieving the more important of these desires. It will also require careful planning in order to achieve balance between fulfilling the citizens expectations and continuing to call for self-sacrifice in the name of national security and continued economic growth. It should be recognized by friends of the Republic that some forms of criticism of the nature of the ROK Government can be counterproductive and prejudicial to the national interests of both countries. It should also be recognized that American style democracy is not always exportable.

Military—Modernization and improvement of the ROK armed forces should continue until the situation has been reached in which the North does not have a quantitative or qualitative advantage over the South that might be decisive in the event of war. The deterrent value of US forces as well as their deployment on the Peninsula should be matched to the perception of our allies in the area, the ROK and Japan, and also to those of the PRC and USSR but most especially to those of the DPRK.

CHAPTER I

AMERICAN INTERESTS AND THE KOREAS ECONOMIES

Historic Interests

David I. Steinberg has probably provided the best description of America's historic interests concerning the Korean Peninsula.

The History of American involvement in Korean affairs is a . . . compound of trade and religion, of concern coupled with ignorance The striking central theme of this history . . . until the beginning of the Korean War was the consistently low priority in which Korea has been placed in official American interests in East Asia

The low priority . . . was less a carefully planned rejection of her interests than a deeper concern with Korea's politically and militarily stronger neighbors, Japan and China

The period of independence (Korean) immediately following the (American) military government was characterized by policies neither designed to help Korea survive militarily, . . . nor economically. The United States was understandably preoccupied with events which were to shape the future of China and reshape Japan; little time was allowed and competence available to consider carefully the future of Korea.¹

From the moment of America's intervention in the Korean War, her interests toward Korea slowly began to assume the characteristics of coherence and foresightedness, and the policies which began to be developed were a manifestation of America's interest in the external, international policies of South Korea instead of exclusively to the internal domestic considerations. Following the war, the United States poured massive quantities of assistance into the ROK in order to assist this newly emerging nation to rebuild and achieve a condition of self-sufficiency. Attainment of this goal, as viewed by the United States, would produce several results that would be beneficial to America: (1) South Korean self-sufficiency coupled with an American-South Korean mutual defense treaty would create a substantial deterrent to future Communist aggression; (2) such an achievement would admirably serve a policy of containment; (3) the strategic importance of Korea would be preserved since attainment of the goal would provide a buffer for the national security of Japan; and (4) America would still retain access to a strategic toehold on the Asian mainland. On the other hand, loss of Korea, for any reason, would also mean the loss of these objectives and could subsequently lead to an unstable, international crisis situation which could ultimately plunge the Northeast Asian mainland nations and America into war. Such a situation would also undoubtedly hazard the national security of Japan. Finally, loss of Korea would eliminate America's only foothold on the Northeast Asian mainland.

Present Interests

Today America still has several vital interests in the Republic of Korea. The first and foremost of these is that Korea must not cause nor be allowed to become the cause of instability or international crisis in the Far East. Based on this, and in order to lessen the burden of the US, it would appear that the ROK should become (economically and militarily) self-reliant. It should also be led by a government that is politically stable and which enjoys the popular support of the majority of its people—a nation which manifests in deeds its dedication to the

principles of peace as contained in the Charter of the United Nations. The second of these interests is that South Korea must not be allowed to fall under the domination, or significant influence, of any nation or group of nations that may be hostile to or aligned against either the United States or Japan, or both. A final interest is that the United States should seek to obtain assurances that it will have continued access in the future to bases in the Republic of Korea, though there may be only periodical requirements for a small American force to be stationed in Korea.

Korean Motivation and Goals

There are many problems of an immediate nature which affect these interests. For example, there are indications that with the announcement and implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, the ROK assessed the probable present and future impact of the doctrine and, being mindful of the restive mood of the American Congress and people at that time, apparently determined that their relationship with the United States was about to undergo a rapid and perhaps even a drastic change. It now seems that they probably foresaw that their client status would soon end and, hopefully, they would enter a close trading partnership arrangement with the US. In any case, they apparently came to the conclusion that the only way they could assure their national survival under such a circumstance was to quickly become as self-sufficient as possible in all vital areas affecting their national existence. In short, they desired the capability to chart and sail an independent course—perhaps in loose cooperation with America but without being critically dependent upon the US for any form of vital assistance from the US. Such an assessment and determination by the Koreans might be viewed as an over-reaction. However, when the Asian scene is viewed through Korean optics, the events of the not too distant past, e.g., the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division; detente with Peking and Moscow; the current US attitude toward Taiwan; the collapse of Indochina; and the hurried visit of North Korea's Kim Il-Sung to Peking, it might be considered that their likely view was indeed correct. Further, these latter events probably served to reinforce the ROK's convictions concerning the correctness of earlier assessments and decisions and probably impelled them to make new ones in the name of national security.

Collapse of Indochina and US Reassurance

With the disintegration of Indochina, the eyes of the world, and particularly those of America's allies around the world, focused closely

on the reactions of the United States. It was a situation not unlike June 25, 1950, when North Korea launched its attack against the South. Then as in April 1975, the world watched the US and waited for some sign of resolute leadership. Kim Il-Sung hurried to Peking to seek support for his plan to exploit what he probably viewed as an erosion of America's will to honor its defense agreements with other nations, but especially to the ROK. However, detente between the US and PRC probably contributed in no small measure to the PRC's withholding material support from Kim's plan to reunite Korea by force. To make sure that the world clearly understood that the United States would honor its defense commitments to others, several clear and unmistakable political signals were made on the Korean scene shortly after the Communists seized control in South Vietnam. In August 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger visited Seoul and commented that in the event of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, circumstances could arise that would cause the United States to consider using some of the nuclear weapons it had stored there to defend its ally. Later President Ford visited South Korea's President Park Chung Hee and stated that the United States remains committed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, "as the presence of our forces there attests." Still later in the same month, Secretary Kissinger indicated that the current US policy toward Korea was based on responsibilities to defend both South Korea and Japan whose situation "is directly linked to the security of Korea." He added that the United States would continue to strive to reduce tension and move toward a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

Troop Reductions

But with the announcement and implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, members of the Congress, the public, and the media began to question more intensely the validity of the reasons which justified the deployment of so many forces overseas. They began to urge further reductions of military forces in Europe and in Asia—specifically, South Korea. As a result, reductions in troop levels in Korea have been made, but today as South Korea approaches financial and military self-sufficiency, some Americans continue to question whether the United States really does have a vital, or even significant, interest in Korea. Is the preservation of a noncommunist, but nevertheless repressive authoritarian regime in South Korea crucial to either American or Japanese security? The continued presence of the US Army's 2d Infantry Division in Korea and particularly its location within range of North Korean cannon remains controversial. Now the call is often made for the complete withdrawal of all US forces from Korea. On 20 August

1975, the ROK's President Park stated in an interview that South Korea would no longer require a US military presence, or military assistance, by the end of 1980, provided any future North Korean attack was not militarily supported by either China or the Soviet Union. A fundamental issue, therefore, for US policy in Korea is how to synchronize the contraction of our military presence so that it does not destabilize the current equilibrium, while still allowing the Republic of Korea to move toward self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible and free from unnecessary impediments to solid progress. The nature of this progress is of extreme importance for it cannot appear to falter or appear to lose momentum or popular support to such an extent that North Korea might miscalculate and take some rash action in the pursuit of its goals, which could draw the world's major Asian powers into an armed clash.

In light of the theory that political stability and military strength are dependent upon, or must be in symmetry with, the economic strength of a nation, then the first condition we might wish to examine is the current economic status of the ROK and the DPRK and then proceed to make a general determination of those actions the United States might take to further strengthen Korea's vulnerably narrow-based, yet still burgeoning economy.

Korea's Economy²

The increase in the GNP for 1976 is forecast to be about 8 percent, a good increase over the 6.5 percent growth rate achieved in 1975. This performance record is rather impressive when one considers that the growth rate of the US in the same period was zero and that for Japan was in the minus category—and the Korean's did this in a period of worldwide recession. In addition to forecasting a good growth rate for 1976, the ROK Government also has expressed confidence in its ability to cut the inflation rate by about 50 percent, down to 13 percent.

Planning Guidelines for 1977-1981

The planning guidelines for Korea's fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan for 1977-1981 assume a real GNP growth of about 9 percent a year with the ratio of gross investment to GNP maintained at 28-30 percent. Exports are projected to increase at 31 percent over the 1975 values in 1976, while the import growth rate is estimated at 12 percent. Exports should approach \$6.5 billion for all of 1976. Textile and apparel exports have recovered sharply with factories working overtime.

Exports and Debt Service

Korea's export patterns wisely continue to make modest reductions in their excessive dependence on the United States and Japanese markets. In 1975, 44 percent of Korea's exports went to other countries compared to only 36 percent in 1974, and the share of Korea's exports to the US dropped to 31 percent from 33 percent in 1974. Japan took 25 percent compared to 31 percent in 1974. Korea's debt service ratio in 1975 was 12.8 percent, up 12.4 percent but still below the 21 percent ratio reached in 1970. A recent consultative meeting on Korea sponsored by the IBRD concluded that Korea's debt service should prove manageable during the next several years.

Increased Defense Spending

Proposed budget measures for the remainder of 1975-1976 provide for increased defense spending and a 45 percent increase in government salaries in 1976. Total expenditures are expected to increase about 30 percent in 1976. The additional costs are to be financed through the new defense tax, which was instituted in July 1975 and which consists principally of surtaxes and a 2.5 percent tax on imports. Defense expenditures in 1976 are planned to exceed 6 percent of GNP, compared to an estimated 5.2 percent in 1975 and 4.4 in 1974.

Decreasing US Share of the Market

Strengthening of the dollar and idle manufacturing capacity in all of Korea's supplier countries will probably sharpen competition and call for increased sales promotion efforts if the US is to increase its industrial market share. A reduction of perhaps \$300 million in Korea's food grain imports in 1976 is expected to reduce the overall US share still further.

Foreign Investment

Private foreign investment approval in the first half of 1975 jumped to over \$200 million. This is 41 percent greater than in 1974. Seventy-five million dollars of these investments were by US firms or Third Country subsidiaries of US firms, a 99 percent increase over 1974. Japanese firms accounted for most of the remainder. Indications are that the possibility of making a profitable private US investment in Korea remains good over the long term. Korea continues to offer a large supply of industrial semi-skilled labor, adequate land, and a full range of governmental investment incentives.

North Korea's Economy

Communist regimes seldom release significant information concerning the current state of their economy, and in this regard North Korea provides no exception to the pattern; however, some information is known. In the early '50s the North Korean economy grew very quickly but then slowed to a growth rate below expectations in the '60s. While the ROK was achieving growth rates ranging between 10-15 percent, the North Korean equivalent never exceeded 3-4 percent.³ It has been widely speculated by experts that one of the reasons for this economic slowdown was the unusually large repetitive allocations of budgetary resources to the defense sector of the economy. During the period 1967-1970, when North Korean infiltration attempts against the South soared and militancy against the ROK was at its highest since the armistice, the defense sector of the economy consumed 30 percent of the DPRK's GNP. Other estimates indicate that the allocation was somewhat smaller—only 20 percent; nevertheless, either figure is significantly greater than the 4.5 percent of GNP that South Korea was spending during the same time frame.⁴

Nature of DPRK Economy and Default on Payments

Because of Pyongyang's reliance on massive Soviet capital and financial assistance after the Korean War, most DPRK factories and products today closely resemble Soviet prototypes. (South Korea, on the other hand, due to trade with capitalist countries, has been able to establish a diversified industrial base with Western technology and techniques.) Kim Il-Sung made a decision in 1970 to expand DPRK trade relations and Pyongyang began buying heavy equipment from Scandinavia, Japan, and West Germany. In 1974 North Korea found itself confronting a rapidly increasing critical trade payments problem accruing an estimated deficit of \$500 million. In the summer of 1975, estimates of the DPRK's trade debts ranged from \$700 million to as high as \$1.7 billion and in February of 1976 it was reported that this communist nation had indeed defaulted on the latter sum.⁵ As a result of this condition, Western European nations and Japan who were owed about \$1.0 billion rescheduled the debt and the DPRK began to make payments.⁶ No conclusive information can be found to indicate what the Soviets are doing about the \$700 million that the DPRK owes them. Information currently available indicates that the Japanese have received no payments on the debt owed to them since the first of the year and in addition the DPRK is not paying anyone, so far as is known, any of the interest that is due on the loans.

Cause of the Problem

There are two reasons for North Korea's problems. The first of these is that in 1973, the DPRK made heavy purchases of expensive plant equipment in order to push the economic development of the country in time for a surge in production to be noted by the 30th anniversary of its Communist Party in 1975.⁷ The second cause for the problem lies in the fact that Kim Il-Sung's government had intended to pay for the imported equipment with their mineral exports. The recession struck, prices were forced down in the West and Japan, and demand for the North Korean principal export of zinc and copper ore fell sharply.⁸ As a means of correcting this setback, the North Koreans have sought a two-year moratorium on payment of debts with various countries. Because the DPRK is so secretive and refuses to provide its creditors with basic economic data, it is impossible to determine the North's ability to pay. As a result, those approached with the proposition have generally refused the postponement idea.⁹

Management of the Economy

North Korea has been characterized as being one of the most centralized, socialized and planned of communism's economies, and it is speculated that she will continue to rigidly adhere to the Stalinistic development model so long as Kim remains in power.¹⁰ Further, this regime does not readily institute reforms or liberalize the economic decisionmaking process in response to urgings for more rapid growth or to slowdowns in development. It has been observed that stop-gap renovations may be resorted to, but that ideology and politics take precedence and it is believed that the regime will continue to emphasize these principal considerations in its economic decisionmaking.¹¹ Based on the rapid reconstruction and development since the Korean War, it can be judged that the DPRK made effective use of the foreign aid it was provided.¹² In addition, based on available information, it may also be assumed that until the recent balance of payments difficulties that one of the principles that North Korea followed without deviation in foreign economic relations was pragmatism and economic rationality.¹³

Speculation of Kim's Role

Now it would seem that this pattern of economic self-discipline has been broken and one can only think deeply about the role that Kim Il-Sung almost certainly played in this development. Is it likely that Kim saw time running out on him? Where once North Korea held a

clear economic lead, we now see that the situation has shifted to South Korea's favor. Could this reversal situation, plus the egomaniacal nature of Kim have caused him to succumb to his own personality cult propaganda and like Hitler begin to believe in his own infallibility? If he was primarily responsible for this economic miscalculation, is it likely that he will make others with even more disastrous consequences for his nation—and others?

ROK Economic Strength Grows

North Korea's policy of self-reliance (*Juche*) serves it well as an effective countermeasure to dwindling foreign aid. On the other hand, South Korea's *Yushin* program (revitalizing reforms) has as one of its principal aims the broadening of contact of every type with as many nations as possible—to include North Korea and other communist nations. Critical to maintaining a posture which will deter attacks from the North is the necessity to remain economically strong. Though the ROK achieved its current economic position as a result of America's continuous heavy infusion of economic aid, we now find that such a large volume of aid is no longer required or provided. South Korea's client relationship with America has changed, and she has since become a significant trading partner. South Korea is making vigorous efforts to help itself not only to remain economically strong but to continue to grow stronger. As part of this effort, it recently concluded a lucrative deal with Iran to build 100,000 houses in that nation during the next five years. The project will cost Iran \$1,500 million and will require South Korea to export manpower, construction materials, and some technology.¹⁴ This is a big improvement over the export of military manpower to South Vietnam just a few years ago. But in addition to self-help, the ROK also needs outside assistance, not in the form of grants, but rather stepped up capital investment and credit guarantees. In this regard she looks particularly to the United States and also to other industrialized nations. ROK Government representatives have stated that during 1976, Korea seeks \$1,800 million in long-term loans and investment, and they add that two-thirds of the sum have already been committed.¹⁵ Other nations, West Germany and the United Kingdom, are also playing an increased role in the economic growth of South Korea. In this regard Japan has for the past few years been a larger investor in Korea's economic future than the United States.

ROK Offers Sound Investments

As pointed out earlier, the ROK continues to provide excellent opportunities for profitable private investment. In contrast to the

balance of payments of North Korea, the Seoul Government reports that the first quarter economic indicators for 1976 reveal that their main economic goals will be easily attained. These goals are a 7-8 percent growth in gross national product, exports worth \$6,500 million and a sizable surplus in the basic trade balance.¹⁶ The ROK's Economic Planning Board also reported that the statistics showed that imports of commodities had dropped by 6.7 percent from the same period last year. Part of the result of this overall improvement in the economy is that the current trade deficit has been reduced to \$106 million in the first quarter of this year, down significantly from \$742 million during the same period last year.

Cost of Aid to ROK

As South Korea's economy improves, its fiscal dependency on others decreases. By 1980 it is estimated that Seoul will be paying for more than 95 percent of its defense bill,¹⁷ and this is a tremendous improvement over those circumstances that have required the US to spend \$38.3 billion since 1946 to assist an ally to remain secure and to achieve self-reliance.

US CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOUTH KOREA¹⁸

	Amount (Billions)
Estimated Korean War Costs DOD (FY 1950-51)	\$18.0
Cost of Maintaining US Military Forces in Korea (FY 1954-1974)	10.8
Military Assistance Grant Aid (FY 1950-1975)	3.8
Economic Assistance Programs (FY 1946-1975)	5.7
Total	<hr/> \$38.3

Building on a base of strong economic achievement, President Park has stated that South Korea can achieve military self-sufficiency in four years—1980. To achieve this, a 15 percent rearmament tax has been imposed on salaries and the percentage of GNP being funneled into the defense sector of the economy will almost double—from 3.5 or 4 percent to 7.5 percent.¹⁹ All of these measures while not extreme in

nature are nevertheless rather strong. As such, they would seem to reveal a national willingness to make some personal sacrifice in the name of national security and in pursuit of the goal of self-reliance. Given this progress, this clear demonstration of a real capability to achieve economic and national security goals with which the United States is in complete agreement, it somehow seems inconsistent with our own national interests to withhold assistance and delay the fulfillment of self-imposed obligations.²⁰

As the economic situation continues to improve, the time seems to be approaching when the US and the ROK will almost certainly realize that the moment is economically favorable and the US might begin the reduction or redeployment of US forces in Korea, hopefully, by fiscal year 1978.²¹

US Role in Economic Growth

If the United States is quite serious about fulfilling its obligations to South Korea and is earnestly seeking to further its national interests in Northeast Asia in the most effective manner, it would appear necessary to decide whether we want to see Korea become a strong and self-reliant ally whose form of government may not be completely pleasing to some but one which by virtue of its total strength and the support of the majority of its people for the government, is capable of deterring, or defeating if necessary, an attack from the north. This choice would seem to require the conduct of US affairs with South Korea more on a pragmatic basis and with somewhat less emphasis on the moralistic aspects of the relationship—at least for the time being. The sooner Korea can achieve this goal, the sooner America should be able to begin allocating significant resources to other high-priority areas of domestic or international need. The alternative to this choice would seem to be some version of the current situation. This requires that a longer period of time elapse before South Korea achieves self-reliance. During this time, other vital and worthwhile projects must await an allocation of resources. It is also a time span in which the deterrence posture of the ROK exists below an achievable optimal level. It also creates a situation in which a seemingly ambiguous signal is given to the world concerning US national interests and resolve because of conflicting views in the US. One element of American society favors the situation just described, withholding aid and a complete withdrawal of American forces. On the other hand, the other element would do all that is feasible, on a timely basis, to assist the ROK in achieving its goals and thereby a posture that deters attack from the north. This self-reliant posture would contribute greatly to the stability and lessening of tension in Northeast Asia.

There are still actions that might be done by the United States and others to strengthen the South Korean economy and to assist them in increasing sovereignty over their own economic destiny. Such measures might include the transfer of technologies that would enable the Koreans to compete evenly in certain markets such as electronics and heavy machinery and certain chemical products. In addition, for the next several years, the US should do what it can to induce other nations who are either uncommitted to the ROK's economy or only partially so, to provide assistance by assuring a sufficiently large inflow of foreign capital so that domestic and foreign savings together equal the heavy investment required to maintain and increase the country's economic and industrial strength.²²

FOOTNOTES

1. David I. Steinberg, *Korea: Nexus of East Asia* (New York: American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1962), p. 32.

2. The information which immediately follows this subheading has been developed over several months using items of information available from several sources. As reported here, this information is not to be found in a single source document. The most frequently consulted sources during the period October 1975 to April 1976 were of course *The Korea Herald*, *The New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and most invaluable of all, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*. I was also fortunate in being able to discuss this subject with personnel of the ROK Embassy in Washington in January and still later with ROK Government officials in Seoul in the latter part of April 1976. Personnel of the American Embassy in Seoul were also particularly helpful in discussions of the topic during this later time frame. I have made heavy use of the *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States*, dated 19 April 1976, which was prepared by the US Department of Commerce and provided me by the American Embassy in Seoul. This document is a succinct, comprehensive, semiannual report of the ROK economy.

3. David Rees, "The New Pressures from North Korea," *Conflict Studies*, February-March, 1970.

4. (A brief but nevertheless excellent discussion of North Korea's economy is presented by Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," *Asian Survey*, December 1975.)

5. "North Korean Lag on Debt Reported," *New York Times*, 26 February 1976, p. 43.

6. Ibid.

7. "N. Korea in Arrears on Japan Debt!" *The Washington Post*, 10 April 1976, Sec. A, p. A.9.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Chung, Joseph Sang-Hoon, *The North Korean Economy*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1974).

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.
14. "Korea Inks Deal to Build 100,000 Houses in Iran," *The Korea Herald*, 20 November 1976, p. 1.
15. *The Korea Herald*, 30 March 1976, p. 1.
16. "Brisk Production, Export Spur Economy Recovery," *The Korea Herald*, 14 April 1976, p. 1.
17. Spurr, Russell, "The Cost of Keeping Seoul Secure," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 February 1976, p. 28.
18. US Congress, House. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1976. H.R. 94-857, 94th Congress, 2d session, 1976.
19. Spurr, Russell, "The Cost of Keeping Seoul Secure," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 February 1976, p. 29.
20. In 1971, as part of the price to obtain the commitment of ROK forces to the war in Vietnam, and to compensate for the withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division from Korea, the ROK was offered a \$1.5 billion armed forces modernization plan. Since that time, partially as a result of constantly juggled financial priorities, in an unsuccessful effort to keep Cambodia and South Vietnam afloat, the modernization plan has lagged rather far behind established goals. At the start of the 1976 fiscal year, only approximately \$1.096 billion had been paid. Further, Military Assistance, excess Defense articles, and Military Credit Sales and Guarantees for Korea in Fiscal Year 1975 were limited to \$145 million unless the President could report to the Congress that the ROK had made substantial progress in observance of international standards of human rights; following the receipt of such a report, the sum was to have been raised to \$165 million. Recently, things seem to be developing more favorably for both ROK and US interests. Last October 1975 the Administration requested \$74 million for military grant aid and \$126 million in FMS credit for Korea. Of these sums, Korea will receive \$55 million and \$126 million, respectively.
21. US Congress, House. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1976. H.R. 94-517, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1976.
22. US Department of the Army, *Area Handbook for South Korea*. DA Pam. No. 550-41 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975).

II

POLITICAL EVOLUTION, REPRESSION AND CRITICISM

Introduction

A Basis for Understanding

Korea's form of government has been the subject of critical comment for several years and recently this criticism has become even more strident. This is not to imply that such criticism is unjustified, but some of it seems to reflect idealism and a lack of understanding of Korea's political heritage. In the absence of such an understanding, it would appear almost impossible to establish standards of social or political development that might reasonably be expected for this, or any other, newly independent nation to achieve within a given period of time. If national development along certain lines is desired, then it seems necessary to recognize that some aspects of a national culture will almost certainly impede progress and as such must be removed. Others which stimulate progress might be substituted; however, it is equally important to realize that cultural traditions die slowly and new ones of value seem to be assimilated at an equally slow pace. Based on this, it would appear appropriate to briefly examine Korea's political heritage and its influence on the current nature of its government.

The King and The Law

The democratic tradition was born in Western Europe and, on a relative basis, has only recently been introduced to Asia. In 1215 Englishmen began their arduous struggle to restrain the tyrannous rule of monarchs by forcing an initial charter which guaranteed certain basic liberties and secured for them a voice in the government of the country. The importance of the document lies not so much in its content but rather in the fact that it marked a beginning of the evolutionary growth of the democratic process of government. In addition, it established the basis for two principles of government which were to become reality: (1) the law is above the king; and (2) the king can be compelled to obey the law of the land. Still later in 1579, during the Eighty Years War for Independence, these principles were reiterated in one of the provisions of the Dutch Declaration of Independence which stated that, "The people were not created by God for the sake of the Prince . . . on the contrary, the prince was made for the good of the people." In Europe while these early moves, which were punctuated periodically by rebellions, were being taken to end the era of absolute rule, we find almost the reverse of this evolutionary process occurring in Korea. It would not

be until 1945 that the concept and practices of democratic government would be introduced to the southern half of the Korean Peninsula.

Neo-Confucianism and Its Legacy

At about the time the Magna Carta was signed, Korea was gradually succumbing to the Mongol invasion. After suffering a long period under the despotic rule of the Mongols, the bond of vassalage was broken and the Yi Dynasty of Korea was established. It was this dynasty and Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) which most heavily influenced the political culture and heritage of Korea. Following a period of court domination by decadent Buddhist monks, the Yi Dynasty sought some viable substitute which might aid in reconstructing Korean society. A principal hallmark of the new dynasty was its adoption of what was to be a long enduring state philosophy of "neo-Confucianism" in which the principal political tenet was a form of authoritarianism based on a hierarchically-arranged order of personal relationships within the society. In effect, this concept of a hierarchical society caused the philosophy of absolute obedience to one's superior to become the principal basis of rule. Those elements of Confucianism that taught benevolence, wisdom, righteousness, and just treatment of subordinates rapidly eroded due to the practice of politics and, in general, only those aspects of the philosophy remained which served the rulers' self-interest. It thus became the vehicle of oppression for the mass of the Korean people and, ultimately, for the corruption of Yi officialdom.¹ Based on this philosophy, it becomes apparent that the most powerful role one might aspire to in such a society would be a political position at the highest level of government. However, there were then always fewer positions available than were sought by an ever-increasing number of aspirants. This situation gave rise to fierce competition at the top of society. Still another effect was the intensification of factionalism in society, in government, and, given the role of the family and clan in this philosophy, long-lived feuds were born.

Legacy of the Yi Dynasty

Perhaps the best, succinct description of the Yi Dynasty and its legacy to Korean political development has been provided by Kwan Bong Kim in his book, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System*:

In summary, the traditional society of the Yi Dynasty was ideologically, socially, and politically an authoritarian society built on the principle of absolute obedience and

dominated by patrimonial heads within a family and by feudalistic bureaucrats within the state. It was a society where individualism was stifled by familial and social status; where the mass of people not only were excluded from participation in government and social affairs but were also lacking any opportunity for social mobility; and where the government was of and for the privileged few, who were often corrupt and despotic and who were internally fragmented by vicious factionalism. This was, thus, a society that not only inhibited the evolution of individualism and liberalism, but also inculcated the political inertia of the masses, the corruption of government, and the factionalism of ruling elites—all of which contemporary Korean society has inherited as the most serious factors contributing to its social unrest and political instability.

Foreign Influence and Intervention

In the declining years of the Yi Dynasty, from about the 1840's to the middle 1890's, the political scene in Korea was one of foreign rivalries in which the Chinese, Russians, and Japanese vied for the position of most influence with the Korean court and cabinet. It was a period in which the court was divided with various factions favoring a particular foreign power while others advocated an isolationist position in the world. Such disunity in the court and cabinet contributed in no small measure to the discontent of scholars, those who felt socially oppressed and the traditionally impoverished and neglected peasants.² The discontent caused this latter element of the population, by the mid-1800's, to cautiously, but willingly, support a movement that combined social and religious aspects and that was both anti-government and anti-foreign. Although slow to catch hold in the beginning, it ultimately grew to such proportions that China, at the invitation of the Korean Government, dispatched troops to quell the rebellion. In reaction to the Chinese move into Korea, the Japanese, who had long coveted the peninsula, sought to block China and intervened in 1894. The short Sino-Japanese War was concluded a year later, in 1895, with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which formally established Japanese hegemony over Korea. Immediately after this authority had been established, Japan began to issue reforms for the Korean Government, some of which were long overdue. Slavery, class structure, and civil service examinations were abolished, and some aspects of Westernization were imposed on the Koreans.³

The Japanese Influence

The Beginning of Japanese Rule

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Portsmouth, Korea became a Japanese protectorate. Later, under the Treaty for Annexation, Korea became a colony and every aspect of the Korean's existence was to be affected by efficient, harsh, authoritarian, bureaucratic rule. All civil liberties were revoked. Private schools were closed and new ones were established by the Japanese in an effort to assimilate the young Koreans into the Japanese culture. Another example of the assimilation effort was the elimination of all study of the Korean language and history and substituting those of Japan. The Japanese also created and enforced economic relations that ruthlessly exploited the Koreans and were designed specifically to serve the interests of the Japanese landowner and businessman.⁴ Resentment smouldered among the Koreans, but years of the Confucian tradition, and fighting among themselves, and with others, had left them factionalized and leaderless. In addition, the rigidly enforced measures of their Japanese rulers prevented them from being overthrown. In such circumstances, little more could be done than to stage courageous, but pitiful, protest demonstrations for which the Japanese repeatedly extracted a high cost for Korean patriotism in terms of killed, injured, or imprisoned. Such demonstrations produced only little, token concessions from the Japanese.

Nature and Effect of Japanese Rule

At the outset of Japanese colonial rule, those Koreans who held high government positions in the Yi Dynasty were replaced by Japanese citizens and removed from government service or they were replaced and demoted to a much lower position.⁵ However, in spite of indigenous protests, some limited international outcry, and token concessions, the Japanese managed to effectively deny the Koreans any substantive, constructive involvement with either the political or economic development or management of Korea. In addition, they continued to systematically expunge all vestiges of Korean culture from the schools and even extended this effort by abolishing all Korean publications. Japanese names were forced on the populace, and Shintoism and Confucianism were introduced into the schools in order to exploit the authoritarian features of those philosophies.

In general the Japanese did little to change the traditional pattern of social rule in Korea. Even those well-placed Koreans who lost their high government positions or their lands continued to be held in high social regard.⁶

Assessment of Japanese Rule

Kwan Bong Kim provides an excellent assessment of Japanese rule:

Aside from economic, cultural, and other imprints left by Japanese rule, the most important legacy was perhaps the introduction of the Japanese bureaucracy into Korea. It was a reimported model of the Prussian type, which was noted for its legalistic, rigid, and authoritarian traits.

Japanese View of Their Rule

Professor Hadata Takashi has described the attitudes of the Japanese and the Koreans concerning the period of Japanese colonial rule as follows:

From the Japanese point of view, it was assimilation and imperialization of subjects. But from the Korean point of view, it was the total liquidation of the Korean nationality. . . .

The Japanese rulers believed that this policy of liquidation of nationality had given benefits to the Koreans instead of pain and torture to them.⁷

Finally, from this combined legacy of the Yi Dynasty and Japanese colonial rule, there emerged, among others, the characteristic of almost absolute deference to authority and a tendency to willingly submit to actions of the government even when those actions or policies were unpopular—and still today, this tendency seems to exist, though it appears to be fading somewhat.

American Military Government and Military Aspirations

The surrender of Japan, in August 1945, signalled the start of the agonizingly slow action of America to occupy Korea and begin the process of rebuilding. Although well prepared to establish military government in Japan and the Philippines, the United States was not prepared to effectively establish a similar administration in Korea nor did it know exactly to whom it should turn—to which resident or exiled Korean—to help it set this former Japanese colony on the road to self-rule.⁸

American and Korean Capabilities To Govern

After several decades of Japanese rule, the Koreans were totally unprepared to immediately establish a popular democratic government, although demonstrations and other expressions in the earliest days of American occupation clearly indicated this was what they desired. As noted earlier, the Japanese had thoroughly smashed all Korean indigenous groups on which a new government might have been built and they had, with equal effectiveness, destroyed or scattered throughout the world those persons who had some potential for national leadership. In the United States Government there was a general lack of awareness concerning the nature, magnitude, and complexities of the problems facing Korea.⁹ Indeed, in hindsight, there was an appalling lack of knowledge about most things Korean.

The Struggle for Dominance and Independence

Having divided Korea by the 38th parallel for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese troops by US and Soviet forces, *the next interest of the United States in Korea was to satisfy the obligations imposed by the earlier Allied declarations and agreements—Cairo and Potsdam.* The first goal was the establishment of a Joint Commission for the task of forming a provisional Korean Government which would operate under a four-power trusteeship for a period of not more than five years. This proposal, which was directly contrary to Korean aspirations and expectations, was, nevertheless, very much in accord with American interests. The US believed this would ultimately lead, in an orderly manner, to Korea becoming an economic and political entity.¹⁰ However, political disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union quickly hardened on how this should be achieved and for the two years which followed the first discussion about how to establish the Joint Commission, every effort to negotiate was frustrated by the intransigent USSR. In view of this situation, the United States took the problem to the United Nations. This resulted in the General Assembly adopting two resolutions which generally called for free elections; the establishment of a National Government of Korea; and withdrawal of American and Russian military forces. Once again the Soviet Union displayed an uncooperative attitude, so elections were held and observed by UN representatives in South Korea only. The elections were determined by the UN Commission to be a valid expression of the will of the South Korean people.

Anti-Communism — A Political Philosophy

Because of what had become a deadly form of competition between the former allies for complete control of the peninsula, a strong anti-communist sentiment was born in the South and on both sides of the demarcation line the occupying powers aided those political groups whose views most closely approximated their own political, economic and social concepts.¹¹ As the Russians hastened the harsh process of converting North Korea into a Soviet satellite and the stream of refugees from the North continued, the resolve of the South to resist communism became more deep-seated, the emotional aspects of the sentiment increased, and a fundamental credo of the South Korean's political philosophy was born. Between the bellicose threats of the North Koreans to reunify the country by force and the extreme measures of the South Korean communists to gain control of the government, the attitude of the South steadily hardened toward communism. It quickly became an ideology on which all political parties in the South were in complete agreement—except, of course, for those elements of the communist party which were then being relentlessly driven out of existence. In the North, the reverse was the case. Rightist groups and those in opposition to communist rule were quickly eliminated.¹² The result of the constantly repeated threats of aggression from the North, the manner in which the North dealt with its liberal element, plus the deep-seated fear and hatred of communism, and America's announced plan to withdraw its forces from Korea as soon as feasible, all combined to plant in South Korea the first seedling of a siege mentality. This pervasive view of national existence, like the ideology of anti-communism, took root, flourished, and quickly became a principal and enduring characteristic of the South Korean's outlook.

Constitutional Dictatorship

Crisis Government

Clinton L. Rossiter in his book *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies*, states there are three types of crisis that may threaten the existence of a democratic nation, both as a nation and a democracy.¹³ The first of these is the threat of war in which one expects to be attacked and invaded. In such a case, a nation must produce a cohesive nation and a military force that is capable of defeating the attack and preserving the sovereignty of the nation. The second crisis is a rebellion in which the authority of a constitutional government is resisted by a large number of people who violently revolt against the enforcement of the government's laws or who through

violence attempt to capture or destroy the government. The third crisis is economic depression, and given the global and calamitous effect of the stock market crash in 1929 and the depression years of the 1930's which followed, it is judged that a crisis of this nature poses as severe a threat to a nation's existence as would a war or a rebellion. To continue to survive in the face of such threats, history has shown that it is necessary for the nation to alter its normal political and social order by varying degrees in order to eliminate the crisis or threat and restore conditions to the status quo ante. The experience of the world's largest democracies, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, reveals that this modification has normally meant that the powers of the government have increased, often to an extraordinary extent, and the rights and privileges of the people have decreased approximately the same extent.

Threats to National Existence

Even before achieving independence, the South Koreans had experienced each of the crises just discussed. The economic situation during the period 1945-1948 can best be described as a disaster. There had been threats of attack from the North and border incidents. In the South there had also been rebellions on Cheju-do and the Yosun-Sunchon incidents about the time the Republic of Korea was established. From its turbulent beginnings, the Republic has always lived with one or more of these threats looming large in the national consciousness and particularly in the minds of the Republic's leaders. Being confronted daily with the ever-present realization that the national survival of one's country was threatened did much to reinforce the siege mentality, referred to earlier. This, in turn, seems certain to have motivated the successive Presidents of the Republic to implement various measures that are similar to those that the major democracies have used in their times of crisis.

Restriction of Liberties

Rossiter in a discussion of *The State of Siege in History, Law and Theory* points out that the fundamental crisis institution of France is the famed *etat de siege* (the state of siege). As a result of the experience gained in their many wars and rebellions and in view of their civil law tradition, the French over the years have provided, in their constitution and laws, for government in times of emergency. The result of this evolution of laws for emergency government is, as Rossiter says, "... eminently a product of history and eminently an institution of law." The end products of this institutional development are clearly

defined provisions for constitutional dictatorship. When it becomes necessary to implement this provision, the purpose of the government is, "preservation of the independence of the state, the maintenance of the existing constitutional order, and the defense of the political and social liberties of the people." However, it is necessary to emphasize that under these circumstances the government may consider that only by severely restricting the liberties of the people, and perhaps even becoming an outright dictatorship for some interim period, can it assure the survival of the nation and the possibility of restoring the former rights and privileges of citizenship. The duty of such a government in any event is to end the crisis and restore normalcy as quickly as possible.

Factions and the Local Opposition

In the Western democracies, political factions normally give vitality and are considered vital to the healthy politics of a nation because they breed and perpetuate the "loyal opposition." It is this aspect of political existence that, in part, has caused the Western democracies to always insist that there be a set of checks and balances upon the power of the Executive. Even in time of crisis, whether it was a period of martial law or the French state of siege, the legislative and the judicial branches have played a significant role in checking the application of the powers of the chief of state. In this regard, the legislature has in general acted in the spirit of the Magna Carta to preserve the supremacy of the law over the leader and to protect the people from abuses of power by the head of state.

Such a tradition has not been part of the Korean political culture and as a result they generally lack the experience and knowledge of how political factions deal effectively with each other for the common good of the nation. As mentioned earlier, there has been little toleration of the opposition in Korean politics. The Korean outlook on this problem has normally been that "those who are not for us are against us," and are thus obstacles to progress which must be neutralized. As the opposition weakened, the tendency has normally developed, for the sake of personal survival, to either go into exile or acquiesce to the actions of the head of state and the ruling party. Thus it now seems that when crises first beset the young Republic in 1948, the actions of President Rhee and the populace were somewhat predictable. Like most people when confused and threatened, the Koreans resorted to those measures with which they were the most familiar and in which they had the most confidence. They granted Syngman Rhee, a strong, articulate leader, extraordinary powers. This was the first in what have

since proved to be a long series of steps that have progressively led to the supremacy of the Presidency over the other branches of government. In recent times this has evolved still further to the situation where the chief of state and the "givers of law" are manifested in the same person.

Rhee and the National Security Law

Rhee was a conservative who favored a strong Presidency. Since he regarded any political opposition as subversive to the national interest, he quickly proceeded, frequently through physical violence, to drive his opposition out of existence. It was under his leadership that the deeply ingrained siege mentality and the anti-communist ideology facilitated the passage of the National Security Law which outlawed the Communist Party, its members and fellow travelers. This law was later amended several times by Rhee, and still later by the group of military officers who came to power in 1961. Enactment of this law was clearly motivated by concern for national survival, and harsh measures were deemed necessary for dealing with the enemies of the Republic. However, we have since seen arbitrary definitions of "communist," "enemies of the state," "subversives," etc. The result has been that the law has, on occasion, been badly misused and has caused the all-too-frequent tragic abuse of some citizens. By use of this law and the more recent decrees of President Park, we have witnessed the suppression of a free press and the effective silencing of critics of the government and the constitution.¹⁴ President Rhee clearly used the law not only for the intended purpose but also for his own political self-interest—the elimination of his political opponent Cho Bong-am.¹⁵ In addition, the ideology of anti-communism and the associated law have easily enabled every government of the ROK since independence and particularly the ultra-conservative government of today to label its critics as communists or "irresponsible critics" whose deeds clearly support the objectives of the DPRK or Marxist philosophy. This frequently arbitrary labeling and the occasional harsh treatment of prisoners have muffled the voices of those individuals who might be capable of forming an effective, responsible, loyal opposition party of the left. There has thus been no compelling voice or movement in recent times which could advocate or cause a return to a form of constitutional government in which those who govern are required to comply with the laws of the land according to the will of the people. Unfortunately, in recent years the trend seems to have been more toward the creation of a self-perpetuating authoritarian rule. This rule has also become one supported by a constitution that has been victimized by the insidious manipulations of various Presidents of the republic.

The First Constitution

After four years of military occupation by the Allies, and with their significant assistance, a constitution for democratic government was drafted and in 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany came into existence. Similarly, after seven years of military occupation and the adoption of a constitution, that had been largely prepared by General MacArthur's staff, Japan gained its independence in 1952. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea was administered by an often wobbly American military government for three years. During this time the South Koreans were allowed a free hand in the development of their constitution. Once again the penalties of diverse political philosophies in Korea and the inability of the various political factions to deal with each other for the common good became apparent. The constitution which was produced was one that represented an effort to combine the presidential and cabinet systems; however, its significant weakness lay in the fact that it failed to clearly define the executive and legislative roles. During the years which followed independence, there was a constant struggle between Rhee and the legislature for dominance. Rhee's interpretation of his executive powers exceeded those provided by the constitution. It placed him in direct conflict with the ruling party who fought a gradually losing battle for years to limit his power.¹⁶ Each attempt that Rhee made to amend the constitution sought to strengthen the Presidency and to perpetuate his rule. After six years in office, Rhee caused the constitution to be amended by removal of the barrier to a third four-year term in office. As his power increased, and corruption in government became more widespread, dissatisfaction with the government grew. However, the rigged elections of 1960 caused this anger and frustration to erupt in what is now referred to as the "Student Uprising." As a result of this revolution, a new republic was formed and the constitution was quickly amended and the presidential system, which was believed to have enabled Rhee to become a dictator, was replaced by the cabinet system.

A Year of Chaos—1960

For a brief period following Rhee's downfall, the flower of democracy seemed to bloom—but there were also a number of thorns. Ultimately, the Second Republic proved ineffective in dealing with the many justifiable grievances of the people. The short year of its administration was marked by the continuing spread of corruption, nepotism, high unemployment, constant demonstrations, and the irresponsible abuses of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people—personal freedom seemed to be interpreted as license. The Student Uprisings had

obviously convinced the people that the way to get action was to take to the streets virtually without regard to cause. During its brief tenure, the Second Republic witnessed 2,000 demonstrations throughout the nation with an estimated 900,000 participants.¹⁷ The various political factions of the Administration continued bickering amongst themselves while the political and economic problems of the nation grew steadily worse.

A New Constitution and Its Effects

The Coup of 1961

On 16 May 1961, a junta of military officers seized governmental power through a coup and immediately suspended the constitution and replaced it with the "Law Concerning the Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction." When civilian rule was restored, a new constitution came into effect which once again favored the presidential system. However, it is important to note that although the constitution was approved by a popular referendum it was drafted by the junta without sufficient free debate and without the participation of appropriate political groups.¹⁸ Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the new constitution reflected the views of the Army officers who were soon to leave military service and become the leaders in the new government. Although President Park Chung Hee came to power as a result of this coup, it is important to note that he was later elected to the Presidency in 1963 and 1967, in elections that were noted for their fairness. As the constitution existed in 1969, Park would not have been permitted to run for a third term. However, the government, which at this time still consisted of many military men loyal to Park, managed to pass an amendment to the constitution, despite strong opposition, which enabled Park to run for another term of office. In 1971, he was reelected for a new term which would expire in 1975. At the time of the election in 1971, there were discussions among intellectuals and in the media in which the general belief was expressed that the appropriateness of adopting a totally Western style democracy by the Republic should be critically reexamined. These individuals advocated that South Korea should develop some new form of democracy that would be uniquely suited to its traditions, culture, and contemporary needs.¹⁹ President Park was of the same mind.

In October of 1972 in a surprise move, President Park declared martial law; proclaimed a special declaration; suspended certain articles of the constitution; dissolved the National Assembly; closed the universities; banned political party activities and the right to assembly. All of

this, he explained, was necessary for the peaceful reunification of the country and to initiate a series of "revitalizing reforms"—to include, once again, changes in the constitution.²⁰ Shortly thereafter, while the Republic was still under martial law, a national referendum was held and the new draft constitution, with its revitalizing reforms, was adopted. Immediately following on the heels of the referendum, the electoral college, which, with few exceptions, was made up of members who were completely loyal to Park, reelected the President to a third term for six years. The opposition protested that this election was fraudulent.

In Order To Maintain Public Order

A comparison reveals that the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed under the "Revitalizing Reform Constitution of 1972" are quite similar to those set forth in the constitution of most of the Western democracies. However, they are also subject to varying degrees of restriction when deemed necessary "in order to maintain public order, public welfare, or the security of the nation." In the early 1970's it appears that, as a combined result of President Nixon's visit to Peking and US/Sino detente, the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the conversations of the South-North Coordinating Committee which were about to get underway perhaps caused Park to feel unsure of the Republic's future. He therefore viewed these events as endangering the continued survival and prosperity of the nation. Accordingly, the siege mentality seems once again to have been revived and there followed the "temporary necessity" of restricting human rights. In line with crisis government in times of siege, the South Korean Government leaders explained that the restrictions were actually for the benefit of "democracy, freedom, and prosperity tomorrow."²¹ With respect to human rights, it is interesting to note that the constitution of 1972, while similar to that of 1948, failed to include two significant provisions which dealt with human rights and which had been contained in the first constitution. The first of these provisions gave a citizen the right to request the court for a review of the legality of arrest or detention. The second stipulated the inadmissibility in court of a confession which had been obtained by means of torture, threat, prolonged detention, or trickery.

The Presidency—A State Within A State

Some of the principal features of the new constitution are that it established the President above the checks and balances between the executive, the legislative and judicial branches that are normally found

in a democracy. It also permitted him to succeed himself for as many six-year terms as he desired, and given the pro-Park membership of the National Conference for Unification, it would seem that he has virtually unlimited tenure. In addition, the new constitution plus the presidential decrees that have been issued in the past several years, have created in the Presidency a state within a state. Such powers and such leadership have been repeatedly justified as being necessary to develop the economy, strengthen the nation's defenses, counter the threat of attack by the DPRK, and to unite the people in order to prepare them for reunification.

The Effect of Manipulation

Professor Kwan Bong Kim has provided an excellent summary concerning the South Korean Presidents' manipulation of their constitution:

... examination of the constitutional revisions has revealed that manipulation of the Constitution for the purpose of strengthening the legal authority and power of certain groups has prevented the principle of constitutionalism from taking root as a strong force for stability in the political process. The Constitution has been frequently revised in the direction of authoritarian principles, often by illicit and unconstitutional means. The preoccupation of the leaders in exploiting the Constitution only as the legal source of their arbitrary rule has nourished an attitude of "Law makes right." This attitude has also led to the enactment of countless laws without regard to public opinion and in violation of the Constitution. As a result, the Constitution has proved ineffectual as a means to limit the rulers, to provide rules of political fair play, and to ensure an orderly and peaceful transfer of political power. Because of this ineffectiveness, the Constitution has not been respected as the basis of legitimacy of government, nor has it functioned as an effective symbol in unifying the diverse forces in society.

The Nation's Goals, Achievements and Costs

Achievements

The accomplishments of the Park Government are well-known, but a brief comment on them might aid in gaining a proper perspective of the cost required to achieve Korea's current domestic and inter-

national status. The economic miracle, which was discussed earlier, is well-known. This achievement is all the more remarkable when one realizes that South Korea has in the space of about 30 years left the age of feudalism and isolation; it has endured and recovered from a fratricidal war of cataclysmic dimensions; it has embarked upon and continues to successfully weather the severest moments of its own industrial revolution; has overcome its former status as a mendicant of other Free World governments, particularly the United States; and, finally, it has taken its place as a major economic power in its own geographical region. In addition, it has gained international recognition for its domestic stability, industriousness, productivity, and for directly assisting an Asian ally in an armed conflict against communism. These achievements are all the more remarkable when one considers the number of underdeveloped nations that have attempted successful completion of the same social experiment since World War II, only to end in failure and frequently at a high cost in bloodshed and human misery.

Poverty and Inept Government

But how are these achievements made possible? What has been the cost to South Korean society for this government and these remarkable achievements? That the South Korean miracle could have also been produced by another form of government certainly cannot be disputed. However, whether another form of government could have done so in the same period of time and while being subjected to the same stresses can be argued, although such a debate would be highly subjective and inconclusive. Nevertheless, there must be agreement that the current model of government for the Republic has been highly effective from the standpoint of achieving the announced goals of each of its five-year plans. The Student Revolt in 1960 and the military coup which followed, as mentioned earlier, were in large measure, though not exclusively, brought about because of the desperate condition of the South Korean economy. These two events were expressions of the most profound nature by the people of their demands for a government that would enable them to lead a better daily existence—constant poverty and inept government had become unendurable. The leaders of the coup took power with the firm belief that, under the then existing circumstances, food had to come before politics. Their priority was to construct, as quickly as feasible, a self-reliant economy and at some social self-sacrifice if necessary. Only with a full stomach, they believed, could one enjoy the arts and relaxed discussions about social development.²²

The First Goal—The Economy

Of the three crises that can threaten a nation's survival, South Korea had by 1961 successfully passed the first one, the Korean War. It had also weathered the Student Revolt only to face another—the economic condition of the country. Based on this latter, most immediate threat, the Park Government was faced with a choice of priorities. The leaders realized that in the modernization process of other countries, the initial emphasis had been placed on developing a consensus of values before economic change began; however, in the case of Korea, the pressures were both so very severe and immediate that the process was deliberately reversed.²³ The military leaders clearly recognized that to build the economy and modernize the nation required a strong national willpower. It also required the ability of a strong leadership to translate that will into productive results. In this regard, Park and his military associates viewed themselves as doctors who were attempting to save a critically ill patient. They believed that the patient's health in the future could only be maintained by protecting him from the virus that had caused his illness.²⁴ It was also recognized that there was no assurance that the desired goals, a self-sufficient economy and a welfare society, could be achieved after one or two or even more five-year plans. They faced an extremely difficult task, and there seemed to be no margin for error in their goals or the management of the nation. Stability, in their view, was absolutely essential for the successful attainment of all goals—domestic political stability in labor-management relations, etc. Based on this perceived necessity, civil liberties were severely restricted. The government exercised extremely tight control over the economy, and those aspects of national existence which affected national economic development were brought under the meticulous and centralized control of the government.

Urban and Rural Inequities

The principal resource that South Korea possessed in abundance at the time of the military coup in 1961 was inexpensive labor, and it was decided to make maximum use of this advantage to accelerate the growth process. Accordingly, those sectors of the economy which were not assured contributors to growth, except for defense, were low on the list of priorities. As a result of this policy, which was concentration on the development of an export-led economy, the agricultural sector has been relatively neglected and has consistently received proportionately smaller allocations from the budget than industry. The fact seems to be that in South Korea agricultural development did not then, nor does it now, contribute as much to national growth on a dollar-for-dollar basis

as do other portions of the economy.²⁵ This situation contributed to an income gap between the urban and rural sectors with the result that elements of the farm population, especially the young, who saw the "easy" money to be made in the cities began, what was to become, a massive migration to the cities.²⁶ In an effort to partially control this migration, which has some undesirable aspects such as overnight growth of shanty towns, increasing crime rates, disease, etc., the government increased their attention to the agricultural sector. However, it continues to lag behind other sectors of the economy in terms of growth and income.

The Lagging Social Sector

All practical resources were pumped into the development of the export-led economy, to the maximum extent possible. This rapid growth naturally relied heavily on low-cost Korean labor and a low priority for public social and welfare services.²⁷ Consequently, the expansion of public health and welfare services was also subordinated to industrial development and the share of the budget allocated to these activities was also comparatively small. Housing and sanitation suffered from a like regard for their importance to stability and growth. However, because of Korea's startling growth rate and newly-won affluence and to some extent because of the muted voices of rising expectations, the government recently has begun to take those steps necessary to provide for parity of rural income with urban wage and salary earners. In addition, more government-financed housing is being constructed and public health services are being expanded. At this point, it should be noted that President Park has been, and continues to be, directly involved in the development of the annual budget and each of the five-year plans. It is a direct, working involvement.²⁸

Human Rights

Comments

Thus far it has become apparent that one of the principal costs for maintaining the current form of government in South Korea and its principal objectives has been the benign neglect of the social welfare sector. If neglect is too strong a word, there can be little doubt that planned improvement in this aspect of the nation's existence has until recently been very low on the list of priorities for development. However, these have apparently been acceptable to the people because members of the media, foreign and domestic, have commented only infrequently about these lagging aspects of the economy. Even substan-

tive comment on the usually emotional subject of unionism is difficult to find. On the other hand, American and Japanese journalists, clerics, academicians, former members of the American Foreign Service community, and politicians have not been reluctant to comment frequently and at length in every available forum on what the audience is normally led to believe is the invariable and glaringly conspicuous, arbitrary and abusive administration of justice in South Korea. Though there are exceptions, one seems naturally led to the conclusion that there is virtually wholesale repression of all basic human rights of the citizenry; that political imprisonments are frequent and numerous; that torture is an inseparable consequence of imprisonment; that prolonged detention incommunicado is the norm; and that political execution is the ultimate result of political imprisonment. Articles and comments on this aspect of the government in South Korea normally refer to the imprisonment and harassment of a former President of the Republic; the nation's leading poet; a Catholic bishop; a political opponent of President Park and numerous students, professors, and journalists, etc. That there have been abuses of power and gross miscarriages of justice in South Korea to the extreme detriment of some of its citizens is undeniably clear. However, it also seems undeniably clear, and equally important to note, that the government and its President have also frequently been the subject of reporting that is lacking in objectivity, or that is emotional, or that is distorted.

Abuses of Power

In any case, it should be recognized that there are other regimes in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East which are aligned with the United States in the Free World that are, at least equally and in some cases, more repressive and where the tragic cost to their citizens is often greater than in South Korea. However, this is not apologia for actions of the Republic's President or the leading members of its government concerning their role in the repression of *some* of those human rights which Americans consider to be basic. It is also not meant to excuse the abuses of power that have occurred such as the kidnapping from Japan of a principal political opponent in exile in order to stifle a voice that was highly critical of South Korea's President and his policies. This is but one of several such mistakes in the application of power. As long as the government remains as it is today—where among other things there are no checks and balances between the various arms of the government and where the chief of state is above the law, it seems abundantly clear that such errors will inevitably continue to occur, though, hopefully, they will be less frequent and with results that do less harm to the national interests of South Korea.

the American presence would not turn the tide. However, these defense lines are constantly being improved as are the South Korean armed forces. However, until such time as these improvements are complete and South Korea is capable of defeating the attack without US help and until there is almost absolute confidence that preparations for such an attack would be detected in time to allow South Korea and US to take those steps to dissuade North Korea or defeat the attack, it appears that heavy reliance must continue to be placed on the ability of an American armed presence to deter the attack.

Mutual Defense Treaty and Deployments

The current deployment of US ground forces is clearly in accord with Article 2 of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea which states:

... Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes. (Author's emphasis)

If North Korea were to launch an attack of the type just discussed, it would clearly be of an all-out nature aimed at seizing control of the country and, as such, it would clearly constitute a threat to the continued national survival of the Republic of Korea. Article 3 of the Treaty states the following:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Various concerns of the United States Senate about interpretations that might be applied to this particular article in the future caused them to attach to its resolution of ratification the understanding which follows, and which in effect appears to make even more specific the obligation of the United States to assist South Korea in the event of an attack which is clearly aimed at Seoul:

It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above treaty, to

South Korean Views

But what do the South Koreans feel about the nature of their government, the repression of human rights, the achievements of their nation, and the nature of their own existence? Part of this answer has already been mentioned in the previous paragraphs and is generally well known. In the author's opinion the government is repressive in the extreme and, in general, the solution lies in replacing President Park, revising the constitution, creating a government more representative of the people, and restoring basic human rights and creating a liberal democracy. Yet, there are other views that are not so well known but which appear to be perhaps as numerous as those of the most severe critics—though few who were willing to express an opinion were without some criticism of the government or the President.

Even President Park's severest critics do not fault him for the economic measures he has taken to rapidly lead Korea to a status as the second economic power in its region, and its emergence as a middle-class power in the world.²⁹ Even a brief visit to the country makes it easy to confirm the South Korean claim that there has been an accumulation of personal property and personal wealth that seems to satisfy many of the middle and lower income people, though those interviewed aspired to still more wealth. Without exception, everyone agreed that they were living in a better style than they had in the past 5, 10, 15, or even more years. Some also acknowledged that the nature of President Park's personal rule was in some ways harsher than they preferred. Several also pointed out that the implementation of most or all the decrees did not affect them at all. Instead, they apparently preferred to continue to earn the certain economic rewards made available by the current government rather than fight to force the leadership to become more liberal. In general, the attitude of most seemed to be: "I'm more prosperous now than ever before and it's getting better; I feed my family well." "Some people may be getting hurt, but not me and not anyone I know." "The government's doing a good job. Why change." "We're doing better than ever before."

Other Views

So at this point, it would seem that some portion of the population has elected, in their daily life, to place the realities of continuing economic prosperity ahead of the uncertain rewards of political activism which succeeds or the certain penalties of that which fails. Some officials of the US Government, both at home and abroad, and some South Koreans expressed the opinion that President Park could restore,

without adverse effect, most of the freedoms that are currently proscribed. There are, of course, others who contend that all freedoms could be restored without jeopardizing national security. Still others in the South, where the North Korean menace is not perceived as vividly as in Seoul, contend that there really is no vital threat—President Park simply uses this theme to control the people and the economy.³⁰ It is also in the industrial centers of the southern provinces where one is likely to hear the view expressed that it is time the government stopped valuing the people primarily for their economic productivity and began to enable them to enjoy the fruit of their labors.³¹ This group would appear to have a full stomach and adequate riches, at least for the moment, and they now wish to be afforded the time and opportunity to enjoy their situation. However, even this group apparently does not harbor strong feelings of resentment against the government or deep-seated frustration and anger because of its policies.

A More Dismal View

There are also views about the government which are somewhat more dismal than those just mentioned. Probably the best report on them, and also one which seems to be well-balanced, is contained in the article "Letter From South Korea" by Robert Shaplen which was published in *The New Yorker* on January 26, 1976. In general, one of the impressions made by the article is that a rather small pot of deep-seated dissent is simmering and since this sentiment lacks a broad popular base of support, for the moment, the pot will not boil over into civil disorders. But the article also seems to make it clear that this feeling of dissatisfaction with the government is growing and that it could be only a matter of time before violence occurs. Still another report on the restriction of freedoms in South Korea was produced by the House of Representatives as a result of their hearings on this subject in the summer and winter of 1974.³² This report contains ample evidence of the repression of human rights in Korea.

Dissent

Who Are They?

Seeing that there is in fact a segment of the population that is disaffected, it seems necessary that there should be an understanding of who they are and who they are not. As the article in *The New Yorker* reports, one American scholar and former government official stated on this subject that:

In order to get a social revolution started, you need a group of turned-off intellectuals, which you have now, and a seething mass, which existed in 1960 but doesn't exist today. There's no denying that . . . the man in the street has never had it so good . . . The church leaders, the students, and the intellectuals can spark some discontent, but their collective influence is limited, and at the moment the economic sphere and the security issue provide Park with the solidarity he needs.

To this group of discontents should also be added the downwardly mobile bureaucrat and the failing businessman; however, the influence of the collective still remains limited. Business is continuing to grow and the bureaucracy is expanding and so are the wages in each sector. But this statement and others like it show that there is a small, articulate, politically active segment of the urban population that is discontent, while elsewhere the opposite seems to be the case.

Still seeking some organized opposition to the government, it is important to note that there is no detectable subversive element in South Korea and no Communist Party nor is there any clear and imminent threat that either will come into existence anytime in the foreseeable future.

The Military

Given the role of the military in the coup of 1961 and in the administration of the government since that time, it appears certain that there is no possibility of opposition to either President Park or his government from this sector. In fact, close observation of the ROK Army can only lead one to the conclusion that it is a highly professional, highly disciplined and motivated force that is thoroughly imbued with national pride. The officer corps creates the solid impression that they feel to some extent as the protector of the nation's welfare against all enemies, both foreign and *domestic*. They would, in all probability, not hesitate to become directly involved if civil disorders, directed at the government, were to occur at this time.

The discussion, to this point, has shown that although serious dissent does exist, it nevertheless lacks a broad base of popular support because, in general, the bulk of the populace is satisfied with the status quo and the disaffected are so tightly controlled that they are powerless to make their voices heard and thus broaden and organize their base of support. Recognizing that circumstances can arise that might precipi-

tate a spontaneous outbreak of massive protests, the question arises, when such an event might occur in South Korea and what conditions might lead to such protest.

Restoration of Rights and Protest Movements

Military Self-Sufficiency

Statements have been made by officials of the South Korean Government about when or under what conditions some or all of the restrictions on human rights might be removed. President Park has said that when the modernization program for Korea's armed forces is complete in 1980 there will no longer be any need for American support to repel an attack launched by the North Koreans which is not supported by any outside source. This statement will undoubtedly lead many Koreans and Americans to believe that when this condition has been achieved that a high degree of self-sufficiency will also have been reached. This could, in turn, lead them to conclude that the threat will have then diminished to a point where many, if not all of the restrictions on basic human rights could be restored.

An Affluent Republic

Commenting on the nature of government in Korea and speculating on when it might become more liberal, former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil stated that a developing and divided country could not afford the luxury of complete freedom; therefore, such freedoms must be delayed until the Republic had become more affluent and confident of its national strength. He suggested that democracy might be possible in South Korea by 1981 when he estimated that the per capita income would be about \$1,000 per year.³³ In addition, in the first year of the third five-year plan (1972-1976), President Park set as one of the goals the achievement of a per capita income of \$1,000 by 1981. That goal is about twice as large as the current per capita income and represents a major economic aspiration of many.

Public Reactions

Given the very great importance of these statements to the South Koreans, it appears that in 1980 when this income level has been reached, or approximated, a larger segment of the population will surely conclude that South Korea has achieved sufficient strength to warrant restoration of at least some human rights. If some relaxation does not occur by this date, it appears probable that there will be civil

disorders that will be sparked by those disaffected elements that were mentioned earlier. However, the frustration of this expectation would seem likely to find widespread support with the lower income elements of the population. Of course, some of the restrictions on human rights were imposed because of the threat of attack and the constant barrage of bellicose utterances from the North. Depending on the nature and actions of the North Korean Government between now and about 1980, the people would probably be inclined to accept it if, for example, no change were made in the anti-communist ideology of the government and the statute outlawing the communist party.

Complete Restoration Unlikely

In general, it appears that when the current decade is complete, the average South Korean is quite likely to expect a lessening of restrictions. To expect that all of them will be lifted, and that a new constitution will be approved which creates a liberal democracy, would be expecting too much according to some. As Clinton L. Rossiter states in his book, *Constitutional Dictatorship*, once extraordinary powers have been granted to the Chief of State or the legislature and restrictions have been imposed upon human rights, it is rare that these powers and restrictions are completely removed when the crisis is past. Thus, while there will probably be some changes, it is unlikely that they will be of a sweeping magnitude or represent a sharp turn toward liberalism. Given the traditionally conservative nature of the ROK leaders, it appears more probable that the regime might be liberalized to some rather limited extent, but then only on a very cautious, carefully phased and controlled basis.

Basis for Protest

Disparity in Lifestyles

But conditions are now evolving in South Korea that can also contribute to the creation of a broad popular base of support for those who urge changes in the government. This movement is led by those who hold out the bright hope of a more pleasant existence for the low income wage earner and for the restoration of human freedoms. By 1981, the people will have experienced twenty years of tough, determined national leadership that had the foresight and courage to be bold enough to make demands upon the citizens for painful sacrifices in order to undertake programs which have proved to be beneficial but which were not always popular. The disparity in lifestyle between the urban and rural population was and is becoming increasingly clear

because of the radio, village television, newspapers, travellers on the ubiquitous buses and relatives who return to visit with tales of the city. It has traditionally been the rural population that has been the most conservative and resistant to social change. This portion of the population has been kin-oriented and Confucianist, with all its attendant ills. However, migration from the countryside to the city is causing the traditional aspect of the culture to erode. The kin orientation is breaking down as is the adherence to the Confucian beliefs. In 1950 the population distribution was approximately 82 percent rural and 18 percent urban; in 1960 it was 75 percent to 25 percent; in 1970, 60 percent to 40 percent; and, by the end of this decade, forecasts are that the rural population will number less than 50 percent of the nation.

Erosion of Traditional Values

This migration has been interpreted, among other things, as indicating a transfer from the traditional to the modern and from the politically indifferent to the politically conscious and politically active citizen. With this circumstance, the disaffected in the urban areas have increased opportunities to enlarge their base of support by mobilizing those who have not yet achieved a lifestyle that approximates their desires. For the most part, these migrants are young, unskilled, and poorly educated. They are frequently without relatives or friends in the city so they often become part of the appalling conditions of the slums. In such circumstances, all too many take to vice while others, also out of desperation, take jobs where conditions approximating those of "sweat shops" exist.³⁴ This element of the population is already motivated to participate in some sort of effort to improve their daily lives. They have frustrated expectations, real needs, and practically no upward social or job mobility. Of equal importance is the frustrating reality that there is no fully satisfactory way that they can make their grievances heard.³⁵ In this regard, it should be remembered that it was in 1961 and 1971 that the urban industrial worker and low wage earner in Seoul took to the streets. Though it has often been said that the South Korean will usually acquiesce to the nation's leader even if the decisions are unpopular, there appear to be reasons why this can be challenged. The protests just mentioned and others that occurred in 1973 and 1974 would seem to clearly prove that today when popular expectations are frustrated, the populace is quick to express its dissatisfaction.

Causes and Effect

This would seem to make it still more apparent that the social and

political values of the South Korean are evolving quite rapidly. The tradition of submissiveness is eroding as is the traditional acceptance of a near-poverty existence and hierarchical class distinctions. The rapid growth of the cities, the process of modernization, a higher literacy rate, better education, and the vastly increased means of communication have all contributed to the creation of new expectations and the evolution of a new set of social and political values for the South Korean. He is rapidly becoming assertive and achievement oriented. He has specific goals that when attained will enable him to lead a better life, and, in this regard, his attitude toward the government is increasingly more pragmatic.³⁶ Apparently, part of this total situation is clear to the government because measures have been taken to slow the migration from the farm to the city. Other long-delayed measures have been taken to improve the existence of both the urban and farm worker. However, a nagging question remains unanswered. Will these measures be enough to satisfy the popular expectations of the people and will they be administered in sufficient time to avert serious civil disorders?

Freedom

The Export of Democracy

In any event, it seems that the era might be drawing to a close when the people were more concerned with the material aspects of their existence than with serious consideration of the political nature of their country. On the other hand, there has always been a sector of the population, as previously mentioned, whose principal concern has been the form of South Korea's government. This group has often stated their convictions that the absolute nature of the President's power and the manner in which the legislature is organized would prove to be unresponsive to the will of the people. It has been this group that has so eloquently championed the cause of human rights in South Korea and attracted the influential support of opinion makers throughout the Free World, particularly in the United States. Such support takes many forms and though apparently well-meaning in every case, it nevertheless seems frequently to be predicated on the assumption that unaltered American, or liberal style, democracy can be easily exported to and assimilated by other cultures. Though there are many views on this subject, one expressed by Lucius Beebe is very incisive and highly relevant.³⁷

The success of democracy in the continental United States has given Americans in their relations with people of other nationalities a messianic fixation of moral superiority

and, until very recently when it became apparent that the project is a bust, has involved attempted tie-in sales of American political thinking along with nationally financed benevolences, such as dams, electric power projects, and military reorganizations. You could have a splendid new railway system if you adopted the secret ballot, or malaria control was available if you bought universal suffrage. . . .

That democracy isn't a universal condition of life, or even in many places a thinkable one, is a distressing idea to Americans.

American partisans of democracy could, if they would, learn a lesson from the fate of American religious missionaries who made a dreadful nuisance of themselves in Asia and Africa in the Nineteenth Century when they undertook to spread the Christian gospel accompanied by the moral prejudices of Circleville, Ohio, to large numbers of contented people already far gone in the practical satisfactions of pagan sin. The plumper and younger missionaries end as the chef's blue plate suggestion, which served them right.

Authoritarianism and Growth

Many of the critics of South Korea's form of government agree with its principal goal of building a strong economy, but seem to be unaware of the economist's view that such development is more likely to occur at a faster pace under an authoritarian regime than under one that is completely democratic. In fact, many credit Korea's continued growth during a recession to the management techniques allowed of an authoritarian government. The critics perhaps overlook the fact that economic development process is generally unpleasant for many. Everyone dreams of the rewards of economic development, yet few are willing to endure the years of sacrifice frequently required by the government and the development process.

Freedom Around the World

The conservative French news magazine *Le Point* of Paris commissioned four French journalists to investigate the idea of freedom around the world. They found, for example, in Algiers that there is but one party and no democratic life. This country's leader was faced with the task of rebuilding the nation, beginning the process of industrialization, and launching an agrarian revolution. The task demanded, "the

mobilization of all minds; debate would slow down the effort. Later perhaps . . . ”³⁸ In Asia, they found that freedom almost does not exist except for Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Concerning economic development, which seems to be the primary goal for so many nations in the Far East, they note that foreign firms demand stability and social order before they will invest, extend loans and generally participate in the development process. But usually the developing nation is heavily burdened by several of those conditions that breed instability and social disorder such as abject poverty, ethnic differences, religious differences, etc. In such circumstances, the French journalists report, the developing nation hears the advice that, “One must deal severely. The message is understood. A dictatorship is born.” And, say these journalists, this situation also exists in Africa. Notwithstanding the political heritage left behind here by the colonial countries, these newly independent nations did not rely long on a constitution, parliament and parties. Since 1963 there have been twenty-eight coups d’etat. Eighteen countries were governed by the military at the time the French wrote their article, and they observed that virtually everywhere in Africa the cult of the Chief or the single party reigns. However, this condition, as noted earlier, does not seem confined to Africa or Asia.

Some Conclusions

As a result of their visits to various areas of the world in search of freedom, the journalists made the following enlightening observations:

Look at the posters on city walls and vacation roads; listen to the radio and read the newspaper. Never have they talked so much about freedom . . . There is nothing to rejoice over, however, if it is being talked about it is to announce that it is dead here, endangered there, in need of defense elsewhere. But never to be extended. Freedom is no longer conquering. It is only stirring debate because it is in a bad way. When freedom is in good shape it makes no noise

Almost all the states of the world have made a fitting bow to freedom by signing the UN Charter, which pledges them to “develop and encourage respect for the rights of man and basic freedoms for all.” They are hypocrites, of course . . . We hear freedom and justice discussed as alternatives. Yet we have discovered no regime where justice flourishes in the absence of freedom

These and other observations led them to conclude that, "Everywhere, individual freedom depends less on the written laws than on the spirit in which they are applied." In general, they also imply that for a myriad of reasons American, or liberal style, democracy cannot be exported to, and assimilated by, another country without a significant degree of alteration and in some cases, not at all. They point out that the Arab rulers welcome economic aid but that with respect to the nature of government and individual freedom, each ruler arranges things in his own way and at a pace that is comfortable to him. This is done quite gradually and with infinite precautions. In this regard, South Korea seems to be little different.

US Concern for Freedoms Status in Korea

Recognizing that varying degrees of restrictions on human rights is a worldwide situation, should we be more concerned about this condition in the ROK than in other countries that are similarly afflicted? What right has the United States to become involved in what is clearly a South Korean problem? If such a right exists, how might America use its influence so that results are produced which serve the best interests of both nations? What should be our attitude toward South Korea on this subject?

Basis for US Interests

In view of the fact that the United States has fought alongside the South Koreans to preserve their freedom; that we have troops stationed there now who contribute much to the continued maintenance of that freedom; that we provide the Korean Government with various forms of assistance each year to maintain their government; and recognizing the fact that in accordance with the mutual defense treaty between the two countries, the United States could once again find itself in an armed conflict to defend the freedom of South Korea, it is clear that the Congress of the United States has the moral obligation, both from the idealistic standpoint of the democratic tradition as well as the pragmatic interests of the United States to carefully examine those conditions and circumstances existing in other countries that might cause America to, willingly or unwillingly, expend part of its national treasure in the name of preserving or protecting freedom. For example, such a circumstance could occur if President Park were to create a situation where the frustrations and anger of the citizenry were to erupt in disorders which appear to threaten the government. In such a situation, the United States would ultimately become involved. In a case like this, it appears that Congress definitely has an interest and should use its

influence in such a manner that the domestic crisis might be averted, thereby preventing the more calamitous international conflict with its attendant risks of escalation.

An Image Mirror of American Democracy?

Such actions by the US could also be motivated by a real concern for the security of the two countries; the nature of the return on US financial aid to Korea; and the deeply-seated conviction of the American people concerning individual freedoms. In making an effort of this nature, it would be necessary for the US to realize, as pointed out earlier, that it would be extremely unlikely that Korea would adopt an American or liberal style democracy. Whatever changes might occur would probably be slight and would occur gradually. In light of this, it would seem necessary for the US to display a characteristic that is more typical of the Orient than the Western World—patience. Change will probably not be swift.

The Effect of Change and the US Approach

It would also seem necessary for those who advocate change in Korea's form of government to be aware that changes regarding human rights are radical changes from the standpoint of the people and the Korean Government. Such changes may be political in nature but their implementation, as anthropologists caution, will probably have profound secondary and tertiary social effects. And there does not seem, at this moment, to be an awareness of what these effects might be. Certainly, there is a dearth of discussion of this subject among those advocating change. Perhaps in the forefront of all American thinking concerning change in South Korea's Government should be the ever-present question concerning the extent to which academic accomplishment, technological competence, cultural development, power and prestige automatically confers to one culture the wisdom to decide unerringly what another culture should have. How far should, or can, the United States go in deciding what is good for someone else?³⁹ With regard to the preceding question, those seeking improvement in South Korea's domestic situation might benefit to some extent by recalling America's reaction to foreign involvement or meddling in its own domestic affairs—however well-intentioned it might have been. Mr. Donald S. MacDonald, then an Associate Professor of Political Science at East Stroudsburg State College, pointed out in 1974 in hearings before a committee of the House of Representatives on human rights in South Korea the following:

The Republic of Korea, like any other nation, should enjoy the right to decide its own domestic policies, unless the international community is affected . . . National independence and self-determination is supposed to be one of the main reasons why this country intervened in Korea, beginning with the Cairo declaration of 1943.

*The United States may wish to view the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as an expression of the bounds which the International community has set to the internal behavior of nations. If so, the United States should be prepared to accept enforcement of the Declaration against any nation, including itself . . . it is essential that they be recognized as essential and legitimate by Koreans as well as Americans.*⁴⁰

Making US Influence Felt

In view of all the preceding cautions, how can the US make its influence felt and cause the Republic of Korea to make even slight changes in its attitude toward human rights and in its form of government. This will be a particularly difficult task. Cajolery will be ignored. Any threat would be regarded as an intolerable interference in Korea's domestic affairs and would undoubtedly prove to be counterproductive. The use of leverage to produce change would also be quite difficult because the simple facts of today are that the Republic of Korea is not that vulnerable. In addition, the Republic's current wealth is such that they are no longer susceptible to a "tie-in sale" of the type referred to in Lucius Beebe's comment, quoted earlier in this paper. They simply don't need or want that kind of "help" anymore. It is equally unlikely that the imposition of penalties in various forms, such as withholding assistance, is likely to work solely to the detriment of the ROK. Such assistance is normally provided because it is clearly in the interests of both parties.

Open Criticism and Its Effect

It is obvious that there are elements of the American public who because of pragmatic analysis or ethical convictions are deeply concerned about human rights in South Korea and who desire to see change; however, attempts to bring about this change through emotional, open criticism of the Korean Government or head of state is most obviously counterproductive in the extreme. No self-respecting leader of any organization—union, city, state, corporation, or nation is

likely to submit to pressures for change that originate outside the "organization." The more strident, blatant, frequent and personal the criticism becomes, the less likely it is that the desired changes will occur. "Saving face" really knows no geographical or ethnic limitations. In addition, no leader wants any suspicion aroused that might even remotely suggest that he is the lackey of any special or foreign interest group.

A Policy for Change

Based on this short discussion, it seems that the only possibility remaining which is representative of diplomacy is to induce, rather than persuade, the ROK that some relaxation in the current restrictions on human rights would be beneficial to the government and citizens of South Korea. This might be accomplished through discreet diplomatic discussions with members of the South Korean Government. Though it is wishful thinking, it would nevertheless be greatly helpful and productive if all official discussion or comment on any aspect of the nature of South Korea's Government were to reflect a full understanding of that subject as well as the culture of the country. In addition, it would make the inducement of the United States seem more credible if it could put its own house completely in order on this subject or, at least, make constant peaceful progress toward this goal.

A superlatively logical approach to the manner in which this problem might be effectively dealt with is contained in the following statement which was printed in the State Department's publication, *United States Foreign Policy: An Overview/January 1976*:

... 'France cannot be France without greatness.' By the same token America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements. A purely pragmatic policy provides no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people can rally.

But when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on truth obstructs negotiation and accommodation. Good results may be given up in the quest for ever-elusive ideal solutions

Finally, it might be well for those demanding liberalization of ROK rule

to reflect on the extraordinary degree of self-discipline that is required of each citizen living in an open and liberal democracy. Though at times serious doubts have been expressed about America in this regard, it has nevertheless done quite well—but at some cost. It is a unique form of government and other nations may never be capable of perfect emulation. For others, it will take a long time.

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III

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

A Force Comparison

The situation in Northeast Asia is directly influenced by the status of Sino-Soviet relations. At present, we do not anticipate that either power is likely to encourage or support North Korea in an attack on South Korea. If there is no outside aid to North Korea, South Korea should be able to repulse a North Korean attack with relatively modest US assistance.

—Annual Defense Department Report¹

This assessment does not necessarily mean that from the overall standpoint South Korea's armed forces are in excellent condition. There is nothing wrong with their organization, training and esprit de corps. They are highly-trained, well-disciplined, and they are well-led—particularly the Army which has a sizeable cadre of veterans of the war in Korea and also Vietnam. The principal limitations on the capabilities of the Services lies in the aged materiel with which each is equipped and the inadequate quantity of certain principal types of equipment. A quick examination of the following data shows the numerical advantage that the North holds over the South with respect to artillery, fighter and bomber aircraft. Not so obvious, but nonetheless equally important, is the numerical and qualitative edge of the DPRK's Navy over the WW II vintage fleet of the ROK.

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)

Population: 15,940,000.

Military Service: Army 5 years, Navy and Air
Force 3-4 years.

Total armed forces: 467,000.

Estimated GNP 1972: \$3.5 bn.

Defense expenditure 1974: 1,578 m won
(\$770 m.) \$1 = 2.05 won.

Army: 410,000.

1 tank division.

3 motorized divisions.

20 infantry divisions.

3 independent infantry brigades.
3 SAM brigades with 180 SA-2.
300 T-34, 700 T-54/-55 and T-59 med tks;
80 PT-76 and 50 T-62 lt tks; 200 BA-64,
BTR-40/-60/-152 APC; 200 SU-76 and SU-100
SP guns; 3,000 guns and how up to 152mm;
1,800 RL and 2,500 120mm, 160mm and 240mm
mor; 82mm, 106mm RCL; 45mm, 57mm, 100mm
ATK guns; 12 *FROG-5/-7* SSM; 2,500 AA
guns, incl 37mm, 57mm, ZSU-57, 85mm; SA-2 SAM.

Reserves: 250,000.

Navy: 17,000.
8 submarines (4 ex-Soviet W-class, 4
ex-Chinese R-class).
15 submarine chasers (ex-Soviet *SOI*-class).
10 *Komar* and 8 *Osa*-class FPB with
Styx SSM.
54 MGB (15 *Shanghai*, 8 *Swatow*-class,
20 inshore).
90 torpedo boats (45 P-4, 30 P-6 class,
ex-Soviet).

Air Force: 40,000; 588 combat aircraft.
2 light bomber squadrons with 60 Il-28.
13 FGA sqns with 28 Su-7 and 300 MiG-15/-17.
16 fighter sqns with 150 MiG-21 and 40 MiG-19.
1 recce sqn with 10 Il-28 *Beagle*.
1 tpt regt with 150 An-2.
1 tpt regt with 30 Mi-4 and 10 Mi-8 hel.
70 Yak-18 and 59 MiG-15 and MiG-17 trainers.

Reserves: 40,000

Para-Military Forces: 50,000 security
forces and border guards; a civilian
militia of 1,500,000 with small arms and
some AA artillery.

KOREA: REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH)

Population: 34,410,000.

Military Service: Army and Marines 2½ years.

Navy and Air Force 3 years.

Total armed forces: 625,000.

Estimated GNP 1974: \$17.5 bn.

Defense expenditure 1975: 353.1 bn won

(\$719 m.) \$1 = 491 won (1975), 397 won

(1974).

Army: 560,000.

23 infantry divisions.

2 armoured brigades.

40 artillery battalions.

1 SSM battalion with *Honest John*.

2 SAM bns each with 2 *HAWK* and

2 *Nike Hercules* btys.

1,000 M-47, M-48 and M-60 med tks; 400

M-113 and M-577 APC; 2,000 105mm, 155mm

and 203mm guns and how; 107mm mor; 57mm,

75mm and 106mm RCL; *Honest John* SSM;

HAWK and *Nike Hercules* SAM.

Reserves: 1,000,000.

Navy: 20,000.

7 destroyers.

9 destroyer escorts (6 escort transports).

15 coastal escorts.

22 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).

10 coastal minesweepers.

20 landing ships (8 tank, 12 medium).

60 amphibious craft.

Reserves: 33,000.

Marines: 20,000.

1 division.

Reserves: 60,000.

Air Force: 25,000; 216 combat aircraft.

11 FB sqns: 2 with 36 F-4C/D, 5 with

100 F-86F, 4 with 70 F-5A.

1 recce sqn with 10 RF-5A.

4 tpt sqns with 20 C-46, 12 C-54 and
12 C-123.
15 hel, including 6 UH-19, 7 UH-1D/N.
Trainers incl 20 T-28, 20 T-33, 20 T-41,
14 F-5B.

Reserves: 35,000.

Para-Military Forces: A local defense
militia, 2,000,000 Homeland Defense
Reserve Force.

Table 1. This information was compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and was published in 1975 in its publication *The Military Balance 1975-1976*.

ROK Modernization Plan

To correct these apparent deficiencies, as well as others not shown in Table 1, such as logistics and command and control, South Korea has launched its Force Improvement Plan. This Plan, together with the Modernization Plan, to be completed in 1980, will substantially improve the fighting capabilities of South Korea's forces and will make the South Koreans self-reliant in their defense against an attack by North Korea. This is, of course, conditional on the fact that such an attack would not be supported by China or the Soviet Union. President Park has indicated that about this same time frame, 1980 or 1981, American forces would no longer be needed for the defense of Korea.

Calls for Reductions

Cost and Morality

In the past eight years, the American force level in Korea has been significantly reduced—from 68,000 to the current level of about 42,000. Of these forces, the Army contributes about 33,000 to the total, the Air Force about 7,500. However, as a result of the communist conquest of Indochina, pressures for the continued reduction of forces in Korea have significantly abated for the moment. In addition, the Ford Administration has made it abundantly clear, both at home and abroad, that the US is "resolved to maintain the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, for this is of crucial importance to Japan and all of Asia." This situation is almost certain to remain unchanged until

after the Presidential elections in 1976, although there are those who still advocate continued phased reductions after consulting with the Japanese and Koreans. Following the elections, regardless of which party's candidate is the victor, it appears inevitable that pressures will increase once again for still more reductions.

These reductions will be justified for many reasons but certainly one which is most likely to be heard often will be heavily based on the speculated dollar savings that will accrue as a result of returning the forces to the United States. Another reason that is certain to be heard is that which deplores the immorality of the United States supporting a repressive authoritative regime. Advocates of this particular persuasion will also urge the withdrawal of all American forces and in addition will seek the discontinuance of all aid to South Korea.

Too Few To Be Decisive

Some view the number of forces stationed in South Korea as not being very important. This group holds that neither the number of American troops nor the unique capabilities of these forces enables them to be a decisive element in the defense of South Korea. Since the forces are incapable of accomplishing their mission, which this group sees as the defense of South Korea, they should be withdrawn. To leave them in their present positions, continues the argument, incurs severe risks, the most fearful of which is automatic involvement of US forces in another war on the Asian mainland.

Deterrence, "Trip Wires," and "Hostages"

Still another group is of the opinion that "numbers" are not particularly important since the primary mission of the forces is to deter North Korea, with or without PRC or USSR support, from attacking the South. This group contends that the principal reason US forces are stationed in South Korea is because of their high value as a deterrent to an attack from the North. In this case, the size of force is less important than its visibility and location, thus the force needs to be only of a size and type that assures visibility. In addition, it needs to be deployed in such a fashion that its deterrent value is maximized. This has been done, they point out, by placing combat elements of the American ground forces astride the three main approach routes to Seoul that are shown on the map (p. III-6): Kaesong-Seoul, Chorwon-Seoul, Kumhwa-Seoul. In the event of an attack along either of these routes, this group contends that deterrence will have obviously failed and America must then honor its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea.

In Opposition

Critics of this view argue that this is a "trip-wire" strategy and that American forces are "hostages" to the Korean Government under the provisions of the Mutual Security Treaty. They argue that this situation should be corrected for a multitude of reasons, one of which is that it poses an unnecessary burden on the United States since the South Koreans are completely capable of adequately providing for their own defense. The immorality of the "trip-wire" strategy is also often heard, and occasionally some may suggest that it denies the United States any flexibility in the use of its forces to assist South Korea or to use them elsewhere in the Pacific area. Others say that in case of an attack by the North that this type of strategy leads to the unavoidable, unwanted involvement of the US in another Asian war.

Deterrence and Deployments

There is another group who argues that by their presence in Korea, American forces have a stabilizing effect in Northeast Asia. They deter North Korea from attacking the South because they provide a highly visible commitment of the United States to peace and stability in the area. Those who share this view are quick to point out that the American armed presence has effectively prevented the resumption of open warfare on the peninsula for the past 23 years. In addition, this group also notes that the presence of American forces in Korea is of extreme importance to the Japanese as well. To both the Japanese and the Koreans, the American presence provides an unmistakably clear manifestation of the interest of the United States in maintaining peace in the area. Lacking any significant defense capability of their own, the American nuclear shield plus the psychological shield provided by US forces in Korea assumes immense importance to the Japanese. In addition, based on the recent statements of Japanese leaders, there can be no question about their views that Korea is important to the defense of Japan for several reasons, among which is the fact that Korea is Japan's third largest trading partner in the area and Japanese investment in South Korea is heavy. Also loss of South Korea would rob Japan of its buffer between the two Asian communist giants, and it could also imperil relations with the United States.

US Pacific Policy

In his speech on United States Pacific Policy which President Ford presented on Pearl Harbor Day in Honolulu last year, the President stated the following:

...In Korea, tension persists. We have close ties with the Republic of Korea, and we remain committed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, as the presence of our forces there attests.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld also comments on the presence of American forces in Korea in his annual Defense Department Report:

US ground forces continue to have a deterrence and stabilizing effect on (the balance of power in Northeast Asia). It would be unwise, therefore, to withdraw US ground forces from the peninsula and jeopardize the stability we have had in Northeast Asia during the last 20 years.² (Author's emphasis)

US Deployment and the DPRK's Dilemma

It is difficult to visualize that the commitment of the President to peace and stability on the Peninsula is likely to change in the foreseeable future, but given the dynamic nature of deterrence, it is equally difficult to visualize that the elements of deterrence that are contributed by South Korea and the US will remain unchanged. However, for the moment, as everyone agrees, it would be destabilizing to withdraw all or even a major portion of the United States ground forces from South Korea. Further, it would be equally destabilizing, in Korea and elsewhere, to redeploy the 2d Infantry Division from its current positions north of Seoul along the Kaesong-Seoul and Chorwon-Seoul routes to new positions somewhere behind Seoul, south of the Han River. Since the principal mission of American forces is deterrence, it seems militarily sound to deploy these forces in such a manner that they are able to protect that which is most critical to the continued survival of the nation. This deployment, if it is to enhance deterrence, should be accomplished in such a manner that when North Korea considers the conquest of South Korea and begins to choose objectives that will assure its quick capitulation, the costs of seizing those objectives will become unmistakably clear. It should be immediately apparent to the North that there is no way that North Korea can achieve a decisive victory in the early stages of its attack without engaging American ground forces. In addition, based on America's defense posture and actions throughout the world, North Korea will not misjudge the strength of American resolve to honor its commitment to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula. Kim must be convinced that if he attacks and engages American forces, the United States will quickly provide aid to South Korea in a manner and to such an extent that the

DPRK will recognize that there can be no hope of defeating the combined efforts of South Korea and the United States. He must also be convinced that severe destruction will not be limited exclusively to the territory of South Korea. China and the Soviet Union must be equally convinced concerning the capabilities and resolve of the US and thus unwilling to risk a significant portion of their national treasure in order to aid North Korea. Most important of all is that the words and deeds of the United States must provide unmistakable and tangible evidence of its capability and resolve to honor its commitment. To do otherwise might cause North Korea, and perhaps others, to make the tragic miscalculation that our actions were only hollow phrases and an empty show of force—a bold, but nevertheless, a false front.

Seoul's Importance and US Ground Force Deployments

The current deployments of United States ground forces in South Korea are clearly in harmony with the preceding. The straight line distance between the heart of Seoul and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is about 24 miles or 40 kilometers. As the former commander of the US I Corps, Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, stated in an interview: "All the Commies want is Seoul. After that they'll dictate peace on their own terms."³ This statement was undoubtedly based on more than just the fact that Seoul is the capital of the nation. Out of a population of 34 million, about 6 million live in Seoul—almost 18 percent of the nation's people. It is clear that the bulk of the wealth is in Seoul when one realizes that 60 percent of the national taxes in 1975 were collected from its citizens and businesses; 50 percent of all commercial and industrial organizations are also located here; 44 percent of the government's investment funds went to Seoul; and 67 percent of the bank loans were to residents of the capital. Statistics also show that 45 percent of the national wealth is concentrated in Seoul.⁴ It is also the cultural center of the country. Located in Seoul are half of the country's four-year colleges; 60 percent of its college professors; 40 percent of its doctors; 62 percent of those involved in art and cultural activities; 40 percent of its television sets; and 57 percent of its automotive vehicles.⁵ In view of these facts and in consideration of the governmental functions emanating from Seoul which vitally affect the nation's prosperity and security, it becomes apparent that a quick seizure of Seoul by North Korea would lead to the end of an effective South Korean defense and its subsequent capitulation. An examination, once again, of the Data Table will show that if North Korea chooses to mass its forces and if it can conceal this fact and achieve a degree of surprise, then it appears it might well be able to punch through the successive South Korean defense lines and seize Seoul. As stated earlier,

the American presence would not turn the tide. However, these defense lines are constantly being improved as are the South Korean armed forces. However, until such time as these improvements are complete and South Korea is capable of defeating the attack without US help and until there is almost absolute confidence that preparations for such an attack would be detected in time to allow South Korea and US to take those steps to dissuade North Korea or defeat the attack, it appears that heavy reliance must continue to be placed on the ability of an American armed presence to deter the attack.

Mutual Defense Treaty and Deployments

The current deployment of US ground forces is clearly in accord with Article 2 of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea which states:

... Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes. (Author's emphasis)

If North Korea were to launch an attack of the type just discussed, it would clearly be of an all-out nature aimed at seizing control of the country and, as such, it would clearly constitute a threat to the continued national survival of the Republic of Korea. Article 3 of the Treaty states the following:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Various concerns of the United States Senate about interpretations that might be applied to this particular article in the future caused them to attach to its resolution of ratification the understanding which follows, and which in effect appears to make even more specific the obligation of the United States to assist South Korea in the event of an attack which is clearly aimed at Seoul:

It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above treaty, to

come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea. (Author's emphasis)

It thus appears that by virtue of the deployment of its ground forces in Korea, the United States has clearly demonstrated an extremely high degree of resolve to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula. In addition, it has provided clear evidence to friend and foe alike that it fully intends to fulfill its obligations if the survival of South Korea should be threatened as a result of an attack.

Circumstances Favoring Redeployment/Withdrawal

Now the question arises of how long must these forces remain in their positions north of Seoul? When and under what circumstances might it be possible to withdraw all American forces from Korea, and if this occurs, what action might the United States take to assist in maintaining or improving the effectiveness of the current level of deterrence?

It would seem that several conditions must exist before US forces can be withdrawn to positions where they would not be involved in an attack on Seoul and under which South Korea and US could continue to effectively deter North Korea from seeking to reunify the Peninsula through force and also to deter the PRC and the USSR from assisting North Korea in such an effort. The most obvious of these conditions is that the ROK armed forces should be so strong and the apparent total strength of the nation, both domestically and internationally, should be such that after objectively analyzing the probability of conducting a successful attack against the South, North Korea would conclude that without significant assistance from China or the Soviet Union, South Korea alone, could defeat the attack and in addition could inflict an intolerable level of damage to high value targets in North Korea. In addition, it should continue to be made unmistakably clear that the United States remains committed to peace and security on the Peninsula. Tangible evidence of this can be provided in several ways. There can be well publicized joint exercises between the US and South Korean forces in which the exercise scenario portrays American forces moving to assist South Korea whose national survival is threatened as the result of being attacked by North Korea. Periodic exchange of visits

by high officials of the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan, which should be well-covered in the press, would also reinforce the impression concerning the sincerity of America's commitment to peace in Northeast Asia. Periodic announcements by the United States and the countries of Northeast Asia concerning the extent of America's growing economic involvement in these countries would also be helpful since it might be shown that from an economic standpoint, the only practical choice for the US is to be prepared to protect its investments by assisting these nations in whatever manner might be necessary to assure their continued national survival.

Difficulties With Redeployment

Concerning the presence of US forces, if it is accepted logic that the constant presence of a nation's armed forces in an overseas area is a clear manifestation of that nation's interest in the affairs of the area, and assuming that there is no significant and clearly discerned reduction in the threat to peace in the area, then it appears prudent to maintain a visible troop presence in South Korea until the threat diminishes. If South Korea achieved the degree of reliance discussed earlier, then it would appear unnecessary to leave US ground forces astride the principal approaches to Seoul. In such a case, the forces might be reduced in size and positioned south of Seoul or somewhere else in the country. However, it should be noted here that obtaining adequate land to accommodate the needs of the force, regardless of size, will be quite difficult and expensive. The cost of relocating the 2d Infantry Division south of Seoul has been estimated as approximately \$500 million.⁶ Of course, the cost would be less if the force were smaller in size; however, South Korean officials point out that regardless of the size of the force, it is going to be extremely difficult to obtain the required amount of land in the desired location especially just south of Seoul, because of the competing requirements for farm use, housing, and industrial expansion.⁷ There is another complicating factor concerning relocation. If the division, or some smaller force, were to be located reasonably close to Seoul, it would be possible for the organization to continue using the existing major training areas located north of Seoul and in close proximity to the DMZ. If the force is located too far south, it would become extremely difficult to continue using the present training areas and new ones would have to be obtained which would significantly increase the cost of relocation. There seems to be little interest on the part of the Koreans for sharing the cost of relocating US forces south of Seoul—at least for the moment. Such an arrangement might call for the US to turn over to the Koreans the facilities it presently occupies north of Seoul. In return, South Korea would make available to US forces the

land required south of Seoul and would also defray part of the construction costs for new facilities. This is not to say that the Koreans will never agree to such an arrangement or a similar one, but for the present time they seem satisfied with the situation as it is. The maximum deterrence is achieved with US ground forces north of Seoul and there is no South Korean interest in changing this arrangement. Some see this situation as another possible expense that must be met in order to maintain troops in Korea, and it becomes another argument for why all forces should be withdrawn from the Peninsula.

Withdrawal and Relocation

Reasons

There are other calls for withdrawal because maintaining US forces overseas is expensive; they create political problems such as those over the use of bases on Okinawa and in Japan; and because they are sometimes considered to be provocative as in the case of US forces in Europe and Taiwan.⁸ In addition, because of detente, we are often reminded that there is no significant threat to US interests by either the PRC or the USSR and, this being the case, it is wasteful to maintain a large armed force; therefore, the best place to make reductions is in our forces overseas. All of these arguments, plus that which contends that we should not use our forces as a constant prop for an authoritarian regime have been used in support of efforts to eliminate or greatly reduce the presence of US forces in Korea. Statements such as these, though undoubtedly well-intentioned, may not recognize America's role as a major world power in world affairs and the limitations on its ability to play that role or perhaps they disagree with the role and/or the manner in which it is played. These calls for withdrawal of forces from South Korea also apparently fail to consider how the nations of the area might perceive this action or the effect it might have on our ability to protect US interests in the area. Specifically, it is difficult to find comment on how we might continue to honor our international commitments and maintain an adequate level of deterrence after the withdrawal has been completed.

Pacific Policy and Relocation to Marianas

President Ford in his speech on United States Pacific Policy last December stated the following:

... America, a nation of the Pacific Basin, has a very vital stake in Asia and responsibility to take a leading part in lessening tensions, preventing hostilities and preserving

peace. *World stability and our own security depend upon our Asian commitments. (Italics mine)*

In order to support this policy, it seems clear that we should continue to maintain the forces we currently have in being. If these forces are withdrawn from Korea on the basis of saving money, it should be recognized that no money would be saved by returning them to the United States. Indeed, the expense of such a move and maintaining them in this country is likely to be greater than the current costs. Stationing them in the Marianas does not appear practical either because, similar to the case of moving the units south in Korea, there is not an adequate amount of real estate to accommodate all of these organizations. In addition, construction costs would be quite high, perhaps even higher than in Korea because the bulk of the labor force, and virtually all construction materials would have to be shipped to several scattered islands throughout this vast ocean area.

Conditions Favoring Withdrawal

Relocating the forces to either the United States or, if it were possible, to somewhere in the mid- or Western Pacific would, under present circumstances, severely limit the ability of the United States to adhere to its Pacific policy. The forces would, in such positions, be too far removed from the area where their visible presence is most effective from the standpoint of deterrence. On the other hand, it might be possible to withdraw these forces from the area under two conditions. The first of these is that the US and its Northeast Asia allies must possess a high degree of confidence in the capability of their intelligence systems to prevent them from being surprised by some hostile use of force which threatened the stability of the region. The second condition that might favor withdrawal rests on the assured capability of the United States to transport a force of sufficient size and in such time to a threatened area so as to be effective in preventing the threat from materializing further or to provide requested assistance in restoring peace and stability to the area. Unfortunately, neither of these capabilities exists and to buy and maintain the intelligence capability and mobility assets required would appear to be more costly on both the immediate and long-range basis than the current relatively modest cost of maintaining forces in Korea.

Perceptions of Withdrawal

Another factor to be considered is how the withdrawal is likely to be perceived by the nations of the area. Certainly any withdrawal will

be preceded by full consultation with Japan and the Republic of Korea. There will probably also be some cooperative efforts to prepare for the pullout. In addition, there will almost certainly be assurances from the US that it has every intention of honoring its commitments. The US might offer the reason that, by withdrawing from the area, America is thus husbanding a vital portion of its national treasure and preserving a degree of flexibility that will enable it to respond more effectively to any threat that might arise in the area—or some similar rationale. In such a situation, it appears probable that the allies will be seeking these assurances, but like any holder of a contract for services to be rendered, they are going to be quite concerned about the ability of the US to deliver on its promise. Further, like any contract holder who is in doubt about some change in the situation, these friends are quite apt to reread their contracts. The words which are likely to trouble them the most deeply will be those which state that each of the signatories, “. . . would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its *constitutional processes*.” (Underlining mine) Next, they are apt to recall that in the not-too-distant past, in times of crisis, the US Congress has either not reacted at all, or has failed to react in a timely manner, or has acted in a manner that has been counterproductive to itself or its friends. In such a situation, some earnest display of our intentions would almost certainly be sought and since an American troop presence is the source of concern, it seems likely that this will be the partial payment that would be desired. To refuse to accommodate this concern in some manner could easily cause Japan and South Korea, each with strong technological capabilities, to take actions which would improve their own security but which could seriously hazard the peace and stability in Asia that the United States has pledged to preserve. Such actions might include the development of nuclear weapons (whether or not they could be tested is not important) and the development and manufacture of weapons systems with range and destructive capabilities that would enable each of them to pose threats of severe destruction, not only to each other, but to high-value targets in China and the USSR. Somehow, the development of such a situation should be averted.

Perception of Deterrence—Friends and Foes

What would be needed most at the time of consultation on withdrawal would be a high degree of US credibility; confidence on the part of the Japanese and South Koreans that they could adequately handle an increased responsibility for their own defense; and finally, some tangible evidence of the US resolve to uphold its stated policy for the region.⁹

In addition, there should be no circumstances that might create the impression in the mind of either friend or foe that the United States is reducing its presence in the area due to international pressures or because of a surge of isolationism in the US. When the negotiations begin, the US should be mindful of the fact that it will be playing to two galleries during the consultation and implementation phase of the withdrawals and that a specific effort by the United States, while being sufficient to deter the DPRK will not necessarily satisfy the ROK or Japan concerning US capabilities or resolve concerning its commitment. In general, it is going to take more tangible evidence to assure and convince these allies concerning the reliability of the US than it is to create doubt in the mind of Kim Il-Sung about his ability to achieve his aims by force and thereby deter him from attacking.¹⁰ Also, the capabilities of fighting a war and deterring a war are quite different and are perceived differently by an ally and an aggressor.¹¹ Professor Yuan-li Wu of the University of San Francisco has provided a most incisive statement on this subject:

...The more confident an ally is in his own capability and in the capability and resolve of the United States, the lower will be the required level of US presence on the spot. The same applies to the perception of the adversary. All of this implies that both the safe level of US force reduction and the geographical aspect of deployment of a smaller force in Pacific-Asia are functions of confidence. When Allied confidence is low, a greater presence and more forward defense will be required. The contrary is true when confidence is high or building. . . . When confidence is fully reestablished, force reductions required for budgetary or other reasons will be safe and feasible.¹²

Deterrence and Capabilities

If the United States, Japan and South Korea had the capabilities mentioned earlier, and if there was a high degree of confidence on the part of all three concerning their individual capability of defending their respective interests and of jointly maintaining peace and stability in the area, and if there was no potential aggressor or threat in the region, then, under these circumstances, it appears that it would probably be possible and certainly highly desirable to withdraw all American forces from the region. However, this condition does not now exist and does not appear likely to exist in quite this form in the future. Although there is detente now, history has shown that this will change and that the threat is likely to become more rather than less severe.

Complete attainment of the intelligence and mobility capabilities is also not very likely. As in the case of the outbreak of the Korean War, it would seem difficult for an aggressor to believe that the US really has an interest in the stability of the region and is willing to fight to protect its interests if American armed forces are not present. The question then becomes what size and what type force might suffice to reassure the allies concerning our resolve and which would also create enough uncertainty in the mind of any would-be-aggressor to deter him from the use of force against Japan or the ROK.

US Force Mix

The deterrent value of US forces would be maximized if they were to be deployed in positions where the enemy could not avoid an engagement with them in the course of attempting to achieve his objectives. The effectiveness of the deterrence might be increased if the US should announce that even though these forces are not capable of turning the tide of any aggression that may occur, they represent only the first of the total might that the US will provide in response to a request by one of its allies for assistance in defeating a threat to its national survival. Based on this logic, the continued deployment of a brigade along the main approach to Seoul and the continued stationing of at least one fighter squadron in Korea would seem to be an adequate deterrent to an attack by North Korea. The principal disadvantage to this solution is that it limits to some degree the ability to employ these forces elsewhere within the theatre for various purposes. A somewhat lessened but still an effective degree of deterrence could be maintained in Korea, although it might be heightened elsewhere in the theatre, if the brigade were to be positioned south of Seoul and the US were to make the announcement just mentioned. Under these conditions, a brigade and a squadron would seem to be as effective as a division and a wing from the standpoint of what constitutes an effective deterrence. However, if the 2d Infantry Division is redeployed south of Seoul and the Wing remains deployed in Korea and the US makes the same announcement as that concerning the brigade and squadron, the flexibility in using force will have increased since brigade and squadron-size elements of the division could be used to counter threats elsewhere in the theatre without diminishing the effectiveness of deterrence on the Peninsula.

The Threat

DPRK

That the threat of aggression continues to exist on the Peninsula

seems abundantly clear. Recently, Secretary Kissinger called for a four-power conference to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Il-Sung rejected the proposal and repeated his earlier call for a "great national congress" of both North and South Koreans to "drive the US imperialist aggression troops out of Korea at an early date," and overthrow the government of President Park Chung Hee.¹³ Evidence of North Korea's resolve concerning this frequently stated position might be judged by the South Korean discovery in 1975 of North Korean tunnels under the DMZ. In addition, North Korean infiltration attempts continue to occur by both land and sea, causing fatalities to both sides. The activities of North Korea's submarines and missile boats also create much concern.¹⁴ In addition, recently North Korea laid claim to South Korean islands shown on Figure 2 that are situated northwest of Seoul and in close proximity to the North Korean mainland. In addition, the North declared that all vessels needed its permission before sailing in waters adjacent to these islands. Though most analysts seem to agree that it is not likely that North Korea will attack Seoul directly, they are not quite so sanguine about the Northwest Islands. Indeed, there is some speculation that North Korea might well seek to capture the islands in order to gain a propaganda victory at home and hopefully to cause dissension in South Korea which might be exploited. In regard to the latter point, some in South Korea would surely claim that the islands were an economic drain on the South and were too difficult to defend and therefore no resources should be wasted in the attempt to save them. Others would see national pride being involved and would push for an all-out effort to prevent their loss or to regain them. Still others would see clear military advantages to retaining control of the islands and would regard the effort to do so as worth the cost. Such an attack would almost surely put some pressures on the US also because some would believe that the US should help in some manner while others would be fearful that US would become involved. Still others, seeing that the attack did not threaten the national survival of South Korea and that South Korea should be able to adequately handle the situation would insist that the US forces should not become involved—for the time being.

USSR

Speaking in Seattle recently, Secretary Kissinger stated that during the past 35 years, thousands of Americans have lost their lives on the Asian mainland. From this experience, he continued, "We have learned the hard way that our own safety and well-being depend upon peace in the Pacific, and that peace cannot be maintained unless we play an active part."¹⁵ This "active part" that the Secretary mentioned is not directed against North Korea alone. It must also be effective with

respect to the activities of the USSR in the region. In this regard it should be noted that the Soviet Pacific fleet has increased in size by about 30 percent in the last 10 years and its firepower has tripled.¹⁶ This strength was startlingly displayed about a year ago when three task forces numbering some 200 ships were deployed in the Pacific—slightly more than were involved in OKEAN-I in 1970.¹⁷ One force entered the East China Sea for the first time and deployed approximately 250 miles off Shanghai—southwest of Kyushu; another task force sailed in the Sea of Okhotsk—north of Hokaido, but still in home waters; and the third group cruised northwest of the Carolina Islands—east of the Philippines.¹⁸ Each of these groups was clearly astride or close to a major shipping lane to Japan. With about one million troops along the border of the PRC, with a powerful fleet based on the shores of the Siberian Maritime Provinces, and with a full range of air support available, the Soviet Union is “a major force” in the Pacific.¹⁹ Add to this presence the opportunity for miscalculation that might occur as the result of a significantly reduced American presence in the area, or no presence at all. In view of what the USSR might be tempted to do that would be detrimental to our interests in order to exploit the internal disorder and succession squabble that seems quite likely to occur when Mao dies, it becomes clear that it is prudent to maintain the investment we now have in our forces in the Far East which serve as a deterrent to miscalculation, adventurism, and expansionism. These modest forces are vital, for as Admiral Gaylor has commented,

“...The presence that counts is the presence that’s there where East Asian leaders can see it. . . .”²⁰ That is the continued installment payment for continued peace and stability in the area. If peace and stability in Northeast Asia is in fact our objective, then it appears absolutely essential that the United States should retain its bases and forces in the area. This objective is not obtained without cost. However, the current cost of maintaining them and continuing to successfully deter aggression where they are present seems eminently more logical than attempting to effect a dollar saving by turning over the bases to host country and withdrawing all forces. This could create the necessity to return at a later date under the most adverse of circumstances and at infinitely greater cost in order to attempt to restore normalcy. And the cost of failing to make the effort to respond or making a belated response to an ally’s request for help, according to the provisions of a mutual defense treaty, would hopelessly cripple the United States in its international relations.

To Serve the Vital Interests of the United States

There simply is no inexpensive way to maintain bases and forces

overseas in order to serve the vital interests of the United States. As James H. Hayes said in his paper, "Alternatives to Overseas Bases," "*. . . we do not save money unless we are willing to have fewer forces actually available in the fighting area.*" To inactivate any combat arms forces in Northeast Asia would be to downgrade our national interests. In view of the threat potential, to remove forces from the area of potential aggression is to heighten the risk of aggression occurring. Korea is clearly just such an area and our forces there serve an extremely vital role that should continue for the foreseeable future. The ground forces may be redeployed in South Korea, but neither they nor the air force elements should be withdrawn.

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization Request and the 1977-1981 Defense Programs, 27 January 1976.

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3. Spurr, Russell, "The Hollingsworth Line," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 February 1976, pp. 26-28.

4. "60% of Taxes Collected in Seoul," *The Korea Herald*, 26 June 1976, p. 3.

5. Ibid.

6. Staff officers serving in office of the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of the Army, and Headquarters of the 8th Army, Washington, DC, and Seoul, Republic of Korea. Interviews at random during the period September 1975 to May 1976.

7. Government officials of the Republic of Korea. Seoul, Republic of Korea. Interview, May 1976.

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10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

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14. Uchida, Admiral Kazutomi, "Naval Competition and Security in East Asia," *Adelphi Paper No. 124*, Power at Sea, III Competition and Conflict (Spring 1976:35).

15. "Kissinger Tries Again . . ."

16. "Moscow: Drawing the Asian Battlelines," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 October 1975, p. 29.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

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